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COMPENSABLE REGULATIONS AND AN
ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEM*
Joseph P. Tomain**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The traditional dichotomy between governmental regulation and takings law no longer represents a viable means of
accomplishing present day societal or individual goals with respect to land use. Internally, the system is fraught with inconsistent application, disparate distribution of governmental
funds, and inadequate remedies. Externally, it fails to protect
our crucially important land resources.
Along with a growing awareness of the need to guard
against thoughtless development of our finite resources, we
are beginning to witness a transition in fundamental philosophical, social, economic, and ethical thought relative to
land-use decision making. It is difficult, however, to reconcile
the need for increased control with our society's constant emphasis upon individual autonomy within a private property
system.
This author believes that a system can be created that
considers both the interests of the government and the individual, attempting to reach an equitable and practical result
with respect to each. This article explores the potential use of
an alternative compensation system relating to governmental
activity in the field of land use-a system based not upon the
highest and best use principle, but rather upon the use of
compensable regulations.
© 1981 by Joseph P. Tomain.
* This article is an expanded and modified version of Tomain & Gregg, The
Need and Validity of Alternative Compensative Systems in Iowa (Jan. 1980), a

paper commissioned by the Legislative Environmental Advisory Group and funded
by the Ford Foundation and the Northwest Area Foundation. This article is a
continuation and development of the ideas presented in Tomain, Eliminationof the
Highest and Best Use Principle: Another Path Through the Middle Way, 47
FORDHAM L. RaV. 307 (1978).
** A.B., 1970, University of Notre Dame; J.D., 1974, George Washington Univer-

sity. Associate Professor of Law, Drake University.
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The article begins by analyzing the internal shortcomings
of the present regulation-takings law. It next provides alternatives which either remedy or avoid those shortcomings. The
author addresses underlying normative and ethical issues that
relate to the proposed system, testing, it for its efficiency as
well as its equity. Finally, the article examines compensable
regulations and an alternative compensation system as applied to agricultural land preservation. The author does not
suggest abandonment of all traditional concepts concerning
government involvement in land use, but recommends that
this area of the law be modernized.
II. THE PROBLEM

Traditionally, land use controls have been categorized as
either an exercise of the government's police power or as an
exercise of the government's power of eminent domain.' This
dichotomy is no longer workable. The traditional dichotomy is
anachronistic and has created three serious anomalies that
render it inadequate.
First, no clear definitive line exists between a valid exercise of the police power and an invalid taking.' The lack of a
workable standard has prompted a description of this area of
the law as "apparently senseless."' s The present standard promotes neither uniformity nor predictability within the law,
both of which are necessary conditions for a viable legal sys1. See, e.g., Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YAL.E L.J. 36 (1964); Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); Berger, A

Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 165 (1974).

2. Generally four "tests" are enunciated for determining when a regulation becomes a taking: 1) the physical invasion test; 2) the diminution in value test; 3) the
balancing test; and, 4) the noxious use test. See Michelman, Property, Utility and
Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARv. L. RzV.1165, 1183-1201 (1967); Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv.
L.Rav. 1427, 1466-86 (1978); F. BoaSaMAN, D. CALLIcS & J. BANTA, THE TAKING
Issuz 51-138 (1973). To these tests may be added a fifth, the social versus legal property test. "Social property refers to those things well socialized people recognize as
the owner's property; legal property means those things that an owner can claim as
his only on the basis of legal advice." B. ACKERMN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TH CONsTnrTION 156-67 (1977). See also Krier & Schwartz, Book Review, 87 YALE
L.J. 1295,
1307-08 (1978) (to Krier and Schwartz, Ackerman's discussion is the "most successful
and convincing account" of the regulation-takings dichotomy); Soper, On the Relevance of Philosophy to Law, 79 COLUM. L. Rav. 44, 61 (1979). The social versus legal
property test is a convenient one, but courts often fail to make the distinction or they
confuse the two. See generally Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
3. Krier & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 1307.
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tern. Take, for example, wetlands legislation which requires
that a landowner obtain a permit before she backfills and develops her land. Assume that the requested permit is denied,
thus frustrating the landowner's desire to develop. The landowner can challenge the denial of the permit or the legislation
on its face as an unconstitutional taking. In one state the legislation can be held to be a valid exercise of the police power,
which means the land can be rendered virtually useless.' In
another state this legislation can be held an invalid taking unless the government acts pursuant to its eminent domain
power and pays the landowner just compensation according to
the land's highest and best use value.8
Such conflicts arise because courts have a multiplicity of
tests from which to choose. Furthermore, the tests themselves
are not internally sound. The outcome of the balancing test,
for example, naturally depends upon what goes into the balance. On behalf of the landowner do we measure the harm
inflicted on the particular parcel in question or do we measure
the harm to the landowner's entire property portfolio? Generally, the balancing test only evaluates harm to the parcel in
question, but in comparison to what? Do we measure the
gains to contiguous landowners? The community? The world?
Where does the causative chain end? Thus, the first anomaly
in the traditional regulation-takings jurisprudence is one of
contradiction-cases with similar fact patterns often reach opposite conclusions.
There is a second anomaly in this area sometimes known
as the "disparity issue." This anomaly concerns the way in
which the legal system affects the value of land and distribution of benefits and harms throughout society relative to land
use decision-making. Return for instance, to the wetlands legislation example. Assume that the legislation was upheld as a
valid police power regulation. The land, which had been purchased for $20,000, had a hypothetical market value of
4.

See Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 336 A.2d 239 (1975); State Dep't of Ecol-

ogy v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 303, 571 P.2d 196 (1977); Just v. Marinette
County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
5. See State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232
(1963).
6. Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal

Decision, 91 HAlv. L. REv. 402, 403-05 (1977); see also Waite, Governmental Power
and Private Property, 16 CATH. U. L. REv. 283, 286-94 (1967).
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$25,000 as a residential tract and $50,000 as a commercial
tract. But once the land use restriction (i.e., the denial of the
permit) was upheld, the land's market value dropped to
$5,000. The landowner thus suffered a loss under current eminent domain law of up to $45,000,7 yet retained title to a

$5,000 parcel of land. To add insult to injury, the landowner
still has tax and nuisance liabilities. If, on the other hand, the
legislation was upheld and the government decided to condemn the land, the landowner could successfully argue that
she was entitled to $50,000 as just compensation. Thus, if the
government chose to use its eminent domain power, the landowner could be the beneficiary of a $25,000 gain (highest and
best use minus current market value-windfall?), or if the police power were exercised the landowner could be the victim of
a $45,000 loss (again, highest and best use value minus value
after denial of permit-wipeout?)
Why the disparity in treatment? What is in reality partially a paper loss to the landowner in the case of the exercise
of the police power (since $25,000 of the $45,000 loss is based
on future expectation the out of pocket loss is only $20,000)
becomes a real $45,000 out of pocket payment by the government in the case of an exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
The decision of which power to exercise, therefore, is crucial and must be made according to a larger frame of reference.9 This requires an examination of the tests and standards
7.

See text accompanying notes 22-29 infra for a fuller discussion of the highest

and best use value.
8. A full discussion of windfalls and wipeouts is contained in

WINDFALLS FOR

WiPEouTs (D. Hagman & D. Misczynski eds. 1978).

9. The higher frame of reference now needed is one which permits consideration
of the normative and positive attributes of a theory of property. This is discussed
below in connection with compensable regulations in terms of equity and efficiency.
For a discussion of normative principles relative to regulations-takings law in general,
see Michelman, supra note 2, at 1214-24; B. ACKERMAN, supra note 2; WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS, supra note 8, ch. 7; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 465 (1978).
The choice of a particular theory of property is crucial. An exposition of the
range of choices is unwarranted here. For a discussion of theories of property, see
Michelman, supra note 2, at 1202-12; L. BECKeR, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC
FOUNDATIONS (1977); B. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, chs. 3 & 4. It is difficult to pick a
single theory as a general theory of property. In fact no unitary property theory ex-

ists. Professor Ackerman's analysis bemoans the lack of a comprehensive view in cur-

rent takings jurisprudence, id. chs. 6 & 7. Moreover, because of the nature of our
pluralist society and because of the pervasive but ad hoc government involvement in
land use decision-making, it may be that no unitary theory is likely to emerge. See,
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courts use to pigeonhole a measure into the police power or
eminent domain categories which in turn produces the anomalies of contradiction and disparity because of the multiplicity
of tests available.
The third and final anomaly might be called the remedy
anomaly. Regulation-takings law does not provide adequate
remedies as demonstrated again by our wetlands hypothetical.
A governmental entity has passed a measure that purports to
prevent the landowner from developing her land. It does so in
the name of ecology because fragile ecosystems must be protected for the greater public good. The landowner who challenges this measure may do so on a number of substantive law
theories: that the regulation violates equal protection principles as it discriminates against the landowner; that it is not
reasonably nor rationally related to the ends sought to be
achieved and hence is a violation of the new equal protection
or the old substantive due process; or, that this regulation is
simply an unlawful exercise of the police power-a taking
without just compensation.
Regardless of the substantive theory chosen, the remedy
is the same-a declaration of invalidity of the challenged governmental measure. The direct result is that the government's
desire to protect the ecosystem is defeated. Yet, if the government's desire for ecological protection is strong enough, it may
1
choose to exercise its power of eminent domain, 0 provided
that this alternative is not prohibitively expensive. Thus, the
police power/eminent domain scheme appropriately may be
called "winner take all." If the government "wins," the regulation stands and the property owner's land suffers a diminution in value. If the property owner "wins," the government's
regulation is invalidated and the purpose behind the regulation is frustrated.
e.g., T. Lowi, THE END OF LmiAnusM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES
(2d ed. 1979). Moreover, as Ackerman's analysis demonstrates, the very concept of

"property" is an evolving one. See also Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property
in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1938); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733
(1964).

10. Although the exercise of this power is not free from challenge, the most
common challenge is ineffective. The argument that the subject property was not
taken for "public use" has not been viable since the late 1940's. Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599
(1949). See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). For a discussion of public use and
environmental protection see W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2.16 (1977).
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Logically, it would seem that owners of devalued land
might have a damage remedy available; inverse condemnation
suits were once thought to be the answer. In such a suit, the
landowner would ask for money damages caused by the regulation or ask for a court order forcing the government to condemn the property and take title subject to just compensation. This approach has not been fruitful.11 As a practical
matter, the failure of inverse condemnation law seems appropriate, given the current state of the law. Otherwise, the
courts would be forcing governments to take land they did not
explicitly want to acquire, exercising a land-planning function
reserved for local governments, and exercising considerable
control over governmental purse strings.
In sum, current regulation-takings law has three serious
deficiencies that might be called the anomalies of contradiction, disparity, and remedy. What is needed therefore, is a
mechanism that steers a course between regulations that depress the value of private property and a strict takings jurisprudence that severely impedes the government's ability to
regulate certain areas of land use decision-making. As argued
below, compensable regulations provide just such a mechanism if they are accompanied by a compensation system that
is truly an alternative to existing law. Such a scheme will
prove to be a positive legal accommodation 12 between the eminent domain and police powers. Furthermore, such a system
can be shaped so that it will accommodate both the norms
underlying today's conception of private property and those
norms that underlie the activist state. Moreover, compensable
regulations can be designed to protect a class of property
interests distinct from those currently protected by extant
regulation-takings law, specifically, a landowner's reliance
interests.
III.

COMPENSABLE REGULATIONS: THE EMERGING LAW

In an era of increasing governmental regulation of land
11. See, e.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125
Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal.

Rptr. 372 (1979), afl'd, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). Girard, Agins: A Step in the Right Direction, 31 LAND UsE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (Sept. 1979).
12. See, e.g., Costonis, "Fair"Compensation and the Accommodation Power:
Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
1021 (1975).
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use, the environment, and natural resources, the legal system
must re-evaluate its standards for categorizing land use controls. By dichotomizing controls into the two broad categories
discussed above, an important middle ground is ignored. A decision to treat a governmental action as a regulation or a taking ignores the category of land use devices known as compensable regulations.
A growing body of scholarship supports the view that the
compensation/no compensation dichotomy is no longer justifiable. The traditional categories were developed during a period of limited governmental involvement in land use and resource protection.'3 Considering the increase in government
regulations that impinge upon a landowner's property rights,
the dichotomy is no longer consistent with social policy.
Compensable regulation is a system that involves the payment of some compensation to the property owner to offset
the devaluing effect of the governmental measure.14 Within
this scheme, the exercise of power is deemed to be a regulation, which traditionally required no compensation, yet some
compensation is given. The term "some" is used in contra-distinction to the "highest and best use" measure utilized under
takings law. Several questions remain: How much compensation should be paid; how much must be paid to avoid the constitutional taking challenge; 5 and, may the compensation take
a form other than direct cash payments? Through this system,
the government acquires an interest" in the regulated prop13. See, e.g., WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 8, at 256-307; F. BOSSELMAN,
& J. BANrA, supra note 2, at 302-17.
14. F. BosszLmAN, D. CALUms & J. BArrA, supra note 2, at 302; WINDFALLS FOR
WIPEOUTS, supra note 8, at 256.
D.

CALLiES

15. The regulation may not sustain constitutional attack if the amount of compensation is not deemed to be the "just compensation" required by the Constitution.
See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (Rehn-

quist, J., dissenting).
16. It is not necessary that the government acquires a property interest; it can
rent:

When there is a harsh regulation constituting a taking, the court
shall require payment of damages while the invalid regulation was in
force. The court shall further hold the matter and permit the local gov-

ernment to consider whether it wants to continue the regulation in force
and pay future damages. If the government so indicates, the damages
shall be the difference in the annual rental value of the property regulated and as it could be validly regulated, with payments made annually

so long as the invalid regulation is continued in force. No property interest is acquired.
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erty equivalent to the right to develop in excess of the
regulation.
The compensable regulation approach has a number of
potential advantages. First, the government can directly attack a land use problem without the need to clothe a particular land use control in regulation garb. Landowners recognize,
then, that their property rights are being diminished but that
the value of these rights will not be reduced to the point of
disutility. 17 Second, the underlying legislation and regulations
thought to be desirable will likely sustain constitutional challenge because compensation is being paid.' 8 Third, the scheme
should promote uniformity within the law by broadening the
categories of land use activities subject to government involvement, thereby opening up a new set of land use preservation
and development controls. Fourth, by requiring the government to pay less money for its activities, sources of capital
may be made available for other needs. Fifth, compensable
regulations need not be inflexible, rather:
Compensable regulations are not intended to supercede public acquisition and zoning where these devices
make sense as means of controlling development. They
are specifically designed to help meet the objectives of
timing and controlling the character of urban growth
through the preservation of open space in private hands.
WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note

17.

8, at 296.
"Disutility" is used in the broad sense to mean that point below which com-

pensation will be required. The question of the amount of compensation needed pursuant to this theory of compensable regulations is discussed below in text. This

"landowner recognition" has also been termed demoralization cost. Michelman, supra
note 2, at 1214.
18. In a constitutional context, the question is raised as to whether or not the
alternative compensation system satisfies the constitutional "just compensation" re-

quirement. Briefly, the argument is that the highest and best use principle is not of

constitutional dimension; rather, it is of a second order and that as social needs arise,

these second order constitutional norms can and should change. See, e.g., Monaghan,

Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HxAv. L. REv. 1 (1975). Under the just

compensation requirement the compensation must evoke the ideas of fairness and
equity. See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 124 (1950).
Thus, the highest and best use principle can be fair and equitable in an era which

favors the development and expansion of resources. In another era that is less inclined to favor such development another measure would be fair and equitable. This
author argues that the alternative compensation system offered here is such a princi-

ple. See L. TRmE, supra note 9, at 463-65. The power of the court to alter such a

second order constitutional rule, or to uphold a legislative enactment which does so,
should be strengthened in an area where the court engages in ad hoc decision-making
as it does in the taking area. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
HeinOnline -- 21 Santa Clara L. Rev. 96 1981

19811

COMPENSABLE REGULATIONS

These objectives can be advanced by a combination of
temporary and long-term controls. The temporary controls keep land suitable for development or public acqui-

sition open and in a natural condition until the time is
right for the development or acquisition to take place.
The long-term controls, through judicious preservation of

open land, can shape development, conserve natural resources, and provide accessible amenities. 10
Sixth, the land remains on the local tax rolls. While the imposition of compensable regulations may necessitate tax relief it
does not eliminate the land as a source of revenue. Finally, a
system of compensable regulations possesses an innate flexibility. There are various types of land use controls that can
be classified as compensable regulations. These devices can be
administered either through a court 0 or through more specific
legislation. 1
Having defined "compensable regulations" we have only
delineated a source of government power and legitimizing
authority. Even if one accepts the legitimacy of the accommodation power, there is no guarantee that compensable regulations will serve any end other than expanding government
control of land use decision-making.2 Such control hardly
represents an accommodation between the interests and rights
of private- property owners and the government's desire to
protect resources unless one asks "how much" compensation
is due. This article suggests an alternative compensation system that purports to define and justify an alternative
measure.
In order to understand the realm of compensable regulations, we must first examine the premises we use in valuing
land. The general rule the legal system uses to value land in
19. Krasnowiecki & Strong, Compensable Regulations for Open Space: A
Means of Controlling Urban Growth, in No LAND IS AN ISLAND 141 (1975). Krasnowiecki & Strong outline their own device which is not followed in this article. For a

development of the history of compensable regulations see Hagman, Compensable
Regulation, in WINDFALLS FOR WnEouTs, supra note 8, at 256-66. See also Krasnowiecki & Paul, The Preservationof Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 179 (1961).
20. See, e.g., MODEL LAND DEVELOPmENT CODE § 9-112(3) (Proposed draft, April
15, 1975).
21. Hagman, Compensable Regulation,in WINDFALLS FOR WnEou'rs, supra note
8, at 269-72.

22. See Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUm. L. REv. 799 (1976).
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eminent domain proceedings sounds deceptively simple: the
condemnee is entitled to the fair market value of his property.2 8 An accepted definition of fair market value, for eminent domain purposes, is a price "agreed to by an informed
seller who is willing but not obligated to sell, and an informed
buyer who is willing but not obligated to buy."2 ' This definition contains certain inherent difficulties: 1) it involves a hypothetical transaction and thus is speculative; and 2) it
presumes full knowledge on the part of the buyer and seller.
When such a hypothetical sale is created, the land is valued
from the buyer's viewpoint because the seller is assumed to
know what the buyer plans to do with the property. Thus, the
buyer who is in a position to develop the property to its highest and best use is valuing that property according to his own
desires. Likewise, the seller attempts to set the price to fit the
buyer's developmental goals. In theory, therefore, the property is sold for its highest and best use value, thereby fulfilling
the landowner's highest reasonable expectations.'8 Even
though it seems somewhat specious to argue that land in an
undeveloped state has inherent value apart from its ownership, nevertheless, the fair market value of the land in eminent domain cases has been defined in those terms." One
might ask why the landowner must be given something more
than that which he actually holds?
Regardless of which theory of economic development one
follows, until recently, land has been regarded as the basis of
wealth. Moreover, the production and development of land,
including the exploitation of our nation's resources, have been
the expoused policy on which land use law rests. It is not surprising that courts have valued land according to a highest
and best use principle, thereby providing a profit incentive
that encouraged land development.2 7 Today, however, environmental regulations seek to conserve our finite resources. It
seems only fitting that the courts reflect this policy in the area
of eminent domain as well. The current trend toward slowing
development, or at least not encouraging uncontrolled devel23.

4 NICHOLS, THE LAW Op EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.2 (rev. 3rd ed. 1974).
24. UNIFORM EMINENT DOMAIN CODE § 1004(a) (1978).
25. See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 12, at 1049-55; Developments in the
Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1429, 1498 (1978).
26. See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
27. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OP AmERIcAN LAW 202-227 (1973).
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opment, can be implemented by abandoning the highest and
best use principle and adopting an alternate valuation
principle.
In addition to the policy considerations discussed above,
the highest and best use principle often leads to questionable
results. The problems can be traced to weaknesses in the hypothetical transaction used to define fair market value. Landowners frequently sell because of an inability, financial or otherwise, to develop their land profitably. As a result, sellers are
frequently compensated for the value of the highest and best
use of their land, when, in fact, they had neither the intention
nor the ability to develop the land to its highest and best use.
The weakness of the hypothetical willing buyer and willing seller theory is that it determines the value of property
based on a fiction of the fully informed and willing buyer
figure. If the constitutional mandate is to compensate owners
of property, then the value of property should be based upon
its value in its owner's hands. In lieu of the highest and best
use principle, emphasizing the particular physical characteristics, topography, and demography of the land, the status of
the owner should be the focus of a land valuation. Thus, the
owner's abilities and plans to develop should be taken into
account s along with more traditional valuation factors. Support for this proposal can be found in the New York Court of
Appeals' decision in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City
of New York. 2 9 There Chief Judge Breitel not only considered
the topographic and demographic characteristics of the Grand
Central Terminal, but also examined the history and ownership of the Terminal and the potential for development of
surrounding parcels. Only then did he decide that the land on
which the Terminal was located had public and private value
wholly apart from its physical characteristics.
The proposed valuation alternative should be distinguished from a pure value to the owner standard under which
property is valued considering subjective attributes peculiar
to a given landowner. A landowner should not be permitted to
argue, for example, that the condemned land has been in his
family for five generations and therefore has acquired a
28. See Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv.
165, 195-98 (1974). Berger argues that taking the owner's knowledge into account in
the valuation process meets a fairness criterion.
29. 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977).
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unique value to him which is deserving of compensation.
However, land is often purchased for a specific purpose such
as development or agriculture production. Such land use plans
are questions of fact, and the owner should have the burden
of proving that his plans are neither unreasonable nor unrealistic. If he sustains that burden, then the land should be valued according to its planned purpose.
Courts appear to have adopted a value to the owner standard by espousing a policy of indemnification. The courts
have said that just compensation is intended to put the property owner in as good a financial position as he would have
been in, but for the condemnation; the economic impact of
condemnation is to be borne by the public, rather than the
individual landowner. In actuality, however, the courts have
not provided complete indemnification. Owners have not received compensation for numerous incidental and consequential damages such as loss of business, loss of future profits,
business interruption, relocation cost, appraisals, surveys, attorneys' fees, and loss of goodwill of a going concern.
If the status to the owner standard were applied to a parcel of farmland that is undergoing development, a result more
sensible than that obtained under the highest and best use
principle will occur. The Farmer would receive the value of
the land as farmland. On the other hand, if Speculator or
Developer recently purchased the land planning to develop it,
the land would be valued by its planned purpose. To the
Speculator the land will be valued as land saleable on speculation; for the Developer the land will be valued for its potential-as a residential tract, for example. These development
plans for the land are questions of fact. The Farmer may
claim that he plans to develop the property as a space center.
If that use of the land is unrealistic or unreasonable in
Farmer's hands, that use should not be used to gauge its market value. If, however, Farmer claims that he plans to develop
the land as a residential subdivision, and he can prove that he
hired an architect and engineer, and submitted plans for approval, it would seem that he did intend to develop a residential subdivision. The land, therefore, should be valued according to its planned purpose.
A status to the owner standard can replace the highest
30.

See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
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and best use principle in all applications of the just compensation clause, or can be selectively used for certain types of
governmental takings.8 1 For example, if a government takes
land for a toll road that essentially will pay for itself, and the
landowner is compensated according to the highest and- best
use principle, the cost of the compensation will be spread
among all those who use the road rather than among the local
taxpayers. Thus, although the seller may get a windfall, the
taxpayers are not treated unfairly. On the other hand, when
the government takes land for uses which are not income producing, for example, for social benefit such as landmarks, historic sites, and parks, use of the status to the owner standard
may be more appropriate."' This alternative compensation
model values land not according to the landowner's expectations, rather it bases compensation on reliance.
There is some debate as to whether it is desirable to shift
the burden for valuation to the landowner. Two points need
to be made. First, compensation to developers for governmental intrusions may serve to encourage responsible and efficient
development. Second, such a valuation scheme should free-up
money for governmental projects currently unaffordable by
requiring that less be paid in condemnation proceedings. The
effect of this proposal turns on whether society accords the
right to develop, without regard to the consequences of development, a higher status than the need for resource protection.
This model is not a panacea for the elusive problem of
drawing a line between regulations and takings. However, it is
a palliative. Given the trend toward slowing development and
conserving resources, coupled with an expanded use of the police power for resource protection, this model can serve a useful function without infringing on landowners' rights. The
landowner is certainly receiving more than he would if the
government appropriated land under the guise of the police
31. There is a trend in land use legislation to single out "areas of critical state
concern," "key facilities," or ecologically sensitive areas for different treatment. See
MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, supra note 20, § 7-201. Comment, State Land Use
Statutes: A Comparative Analysis, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1154, 1154-55 (1977); D.
MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND CONTROLS LEGISLATION 63-126 (1976).
32. It has been suggested by Professor Sax that a difference exists when the
government is engaging in a proprietary function, that is, an income producing activity, as opposed to when the government is engaged in an enterprise function. Sax,
supra note 1.
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IV.

POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ISSUES OF THE ALTERNATIVE
COMPENSATION SYSTEM

Any discussion of "takings" jurisprudence inevitably
raises two questions. First, when is compensation due? Second, how much compensation is due? If one starts with a utilitarian theory of property, 4 the goal of which is to maximizes"

wealth, social welfare or land values, then compensation can
be said to be due "when" aggregate land value, for example, is
reduced below a certain defined level. The answer to the "how
much" compensation question can then be said to be that
amount which brings the land value up to that defined level. ss
Nevertheless, these questions are sufficiently distinct to deserve separate treatment and this article concentrates on the
"how much" question. Traditionally, takings jurisprudence
has paid more attention to the first question than to the second. This is understandable for two reasons. First, the confusing regulations-takings dichotomy with its compensation-no
compensation corollary has led commentators to search for
guidance to determine when a regulation becomes a taking in
the existing morass of case law.87 Second, efforts to define
"when" have often led legal scholars to intriguing theories of
33. The preceding discussion is taken from Tomain, Eliminationof the Highest
and Best Use Principle: Another Path through the Middle Way, 47 FORDHAM L.

REV. 307 (1978).
34. Again, note the return to "first principles," Michelman, supra note 2, at
1171, and "hard philosophy," B. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 5.
35. Another terminological problem must be noted here. For analytic convenience it is desirable to separate positive "efficiency" analysis from normative or ethical decision-making. Yet the split is not an easy one. Micheiman, for example, discussed "efficiency" in terms of "ethical maximizing." Michelman, supra note 2, at
1173. Furthermore, what is specifically maximized, be it happiness in general or land
values in particular, is not crucial at thig stage of the analysis. The important point to
note is that a utilitarian theory of property has as its end (consequence) the maximization of something. See, e.g., J.J.C. SMART & B. WMLIAMS, UTILITARIANIsM: FOR &
AGAINST (1973).

36. See, e.g., Costonis, supra note 12, at 1049-52. Given current law, this situation does not frequently occur because 1) there is no unitary theory of property; 2)
there is not universal definition of "when" compensation is due; and, 3) even though
we might agree that the highest and best use principle is the accepted measure of
"how much" is due under the exercise of the eminent domain power, the distinct
possibility remains that between two similarly situated landowners who are affected
with the same land use restriction one landowner may receive no compensation.
37. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
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government, causing them to ignore the narrower issue of how
much compensation is due."
This section emphasizes the positive and normative economic principles which support a changed scheme of compensable regulations. It should be noted that the separability or
lack of separability of the "when" and "how much" issues is
child's play compared to the overlap and crossover of the positive and normative issues involved in takings law." The positive-normative distinction is made for convenience and is
made with reference to some of the literature involved in the
economic and fairness analysis of the compensation issue.
A. Efficiency Criteria
Efficiency is used here as a positive criterion for evaluating the alternative compensation system. According to Posner,
"'efficiency' means exploiting economic resources
so that
'value'-human satisfaction as measured by aggregate
consumer willingness to pay for goods and services-is
maximized."' 0
The efficiency criterion also has normative impacts. In
fact there is a good deal of crossover into normative areas by
the very definition of efficiency.41 Even within the simple definition chosen here, for example, the concept of value is highly
individualistic and relative. What has value for one person
may not have the same value for someone else. That someone
else may either pay more or less evinces economic value preference. Moreover, the efficiency criterion, as a positive tool,
encapsulates certain assumptions. We may not all agree that
38. See, e.g., Siegan, Editor's Introduction: The Anomaly of Regulation under
the Taking Clause, in PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES 22-39 (1977); and, R. NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 78-84, 114-15 (1974).
39. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62

MINN. L. REv. 1015 (1978); R. Postur, PRoPERTY RiGHTS INLAW AND ECONOMICS: THE
CASE op BROADCAST FREQUENCmS, in ECONoMIc ANALYSIS oF LAW § 2.2 (2d ed. 1974).

See also Stein, Adam Smith's Jurisprudence-BetweenMorality and Economics, 64
CORNELL L. Rfv. 621 (1979).
40. R. PoSNER, supra note 39, at 10. This is a somewhat simplified version of

Posner's definition.
41. Professor Michelman offers three variations on an efficiency criterion he
called "value maximization." The variations are Social Welfare Maximization, Social

Justice

Maximization

and

Preference-Adjusted

Social

Justice

Superiority.

Michelman, supra note 39, at 1033-34. In an earlier work, he states that the concept
of efficiency, to begin with, is a concept of ethical maximizing thus mixing the posi-

tive and normative aspects of efficiency. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1173.
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these assumptions are true, or if true, universal. The first assumption is that man is an egoist, a rational maximizer of his
own self interest. This behavioral characteristic of economic
42
man as an egoist is not tested by the efficiency criterion. A
second assumption finds value in maximization of total social
output, a value aptly illustrated by the notion that the bigger
the pie, the bigger the pieces, and therefore, the greater the
good. ' Does this tract well with the first assumption? Might

not the pie get bigger through collective action or altruism"'
rather than through egoism? And, is it not possible that less is
more?
Another assumption is that valuations, as measured by
one's willingness to pay,4 5 are interchangeable. In order to
make this assumption workable, quantification of values is
46
necessary. If values are not interchangeable or quantification
47
of value preferences is impossible then the resulting quan4
tity "willingness to pay" is not an accurate measure. ' Finally,
for all the elegance of economic analysis it must be
remembered that, at least as far as law is concerned, the economic framework is only part of a larger political and social
fabric.4 9 Further, the reductionist tendencies of economic
analysis must be avoided. The law is not solely the embodiment of economic precepts.5 0 Why then employ such a tool?
42. See, e.g., Sen, Rational Fools: A Critiqueof the Behavioral Foundationsof
Economic Theory, 6 PHILOSOPHY & PuR. An. 317 (1977).
43. See, e.g., WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 8, at 143.
44. Posner points out that the self-interest factor does not necessarily mean
selfishness because an actor can take the happi'ess or misery of other people into
account as part of his own satisfactions. R. PosNER, supra note 39, at 1 & ch. 5. This
merely expands the locus of self interest; it does not change its compass. The danger
with such an all-encompassing position and definition of efficiency is that if everything is always taken into account, the analogical construct utilized may expand to
the point of collapse. See, e.g., Sopor, supra note 2, at 44-45; J.J.C. SMART & B. WLLIAMS, supra note 35, at 88, 100; and, N. CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND RESPONSIBILITY 6470 (1977).
45.

R. POSNER, supra note 39, at 10.

46. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 39, at 1020; R. STEWART & J. KRIR, ENvIRONmENTAL LAW & POLICY 103-07 (2d ed. 1978).
47. See, e.g., E. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL 36-47 (1973).
48. See text accompanying notes 35 & 44 supra.
49. See Schwartz, Economics, Wealth Distribution and Justice, 1979 Wis. L.
Rav. 799; Graff, Book Review, 93 H~av. L. Rv. 282 (1979); and C. FRIED, RIGHT AND
WRONG 81-107 (1978). Professor Fried presents a cogent critique of the economic
analysis of rights yet he does not dismiss this analysis as useless. He does warn
against its reductionist tendencies.
50. Michelman, supra note 39, at 1036-37, 1039, 1046-47.
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Simply, economic analysis helps isolate and illuminate the

value choices that individuals and entities are being asked to
make. Thus one variable against which the alternative compensation system will be tested is that of efficiency: What impact will the proposal have on efficiency?
1. Allocation of resources. In reviewing specific criteria,

two basic questions must be asked: How does the particular
criterion, here the allocation of resources, maximize efficiency? Second, how does the alternative compensative sys-

tem affect the more specific criterion?
Today the central concept behind allocation of resources
stems from the welfare economics of Vilfred 0. Pareto. An

allocation of resources is Pareto-superior "if and only if at
least one person believes himself better off" and "nobody believes himself worse off."51 A corollary rule is that of Paretooptimality: An allocation of resources is Pareto-optimal if it is
impossible to move to "any other social state without making
at least one person worse off."52 At its most basic level, allocations that are Pareto-superior, positively meet the efficiency
criteria because the aggregate value is maximized under such
a formula (i.e., society's gross value is maximized; hence, the
efficiency principle, in its simplist form, is satisfied.). But this
is not necessarily value maximizing, nor fair. Suppose an allo-

cation of resources can be devised in which Jones, who is rich,
gains, and Smith, who is poor, is unaffected.53 Seemingly the
allocation is efficient because it increases society's aggregate
benefits and it is Pareto-superior because no one is worse off.
Justice Bazelon has noted in his dissent:
The second and a more sophisticated reason for relieving the landlord
from liability is the hypothesis that "it is still socially desirable not to
discourage investment in and ownership of real estate, particularly private dwellings." This objective may well be desirable. But it is a fallacious over-simplification to suppose that the common law rule has much
to do with the rate of investment in real property. On the other hand, it
seems clear to me that the rule operates to defeat the interests of utility
and justice.
Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 935
(1953).
51. Ackerman, Introduction, in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW xi
(B. Ackerman ed. 1975).
52. Id. at xiv. For other formulations, see Michelman, supra note 2, at 1168; R.
STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 46, at 101-03; Johnson, Planning Without Prices: A
Discussion of Land Use Regulation Without Compensation, in PLANNING WITHOUT
PRICES, supra note 38, at 72-73.
53. WINDFALLS FOR WiPEoUTs, supra note 8, at 144.
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Or are they? Is not Smith worse off because the imbalance in
the distribution of income has been exacerbated? With a more
refined analysis we could argue that indeed the allocation is
not Pareto-superior, because Smith is made worse off by the
income disparity even though he loses nothing from his balance sheet. The point is that reference must be made to a normative criterion, such as the distribution of wealth and income, before a resource allocation plan is validated.
The proposed alternative compensation system suggests
that, for a given property regime," land that is either taken or
restricted will be compensated at the land's actual use value,55
taking into account the status of the landowner, rather than
at the land's highest and best use value. How does this affect
the allocation of resources within the context of the Pareto
rule? On its face, the alternative compensation system is neutral. The government may restrict but it must pay for its actions. Hence, the compensated owner is neither worse off nor
better off in an absolute dollar sense, because there has been
an exchange of equivalents. The government has paid the affected landowner the value of that land at the time of the restriction. The landowner might argue that the value of land to
him is greater than an equivalent value in money. He may insist that restrictions placed on a portion of his property have
impaired the value of the whole. The response to the first
argument is that the landowner may reinvest in land. The
counter to the second argument is that the rules for condemnation in partial takings cases can be used.se The effect on
aggregate value is neutral. There is no gain or loss to the landowner. Yet he may still object on grounds that his opportunity
to make a profit has been eliminated because his expectation
of future use has been taken.57 It is indeed true that the alternative compensation system has shifted the focus from future
expectations to past and present reliance. However, the land54. The second half of this article discusses the application of this scheme to
preserve agricultural land. This is not a unique case. The proposal could have applicability to a number of areas, e.g., wetlands, open-space, and historic preservation.
Now that society, with the thrust of the environmental movement, is into a "second
generation" of land-use regulation, there may be a need for a broad application of
this system to all compensable regulation or to all classes of takings cases.
55. If land is restricted, then an amount of compensation will be paid to raise
the value of the land to its actual use value at the time of the restriction.
56. 4A NICHOLS, supra note 23, § 14.2.
57. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 1168-69.
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owner who can demonstrate that plans for future development
are imminent will receive compensation. The farmer, who is
preparing to subdivide a portion of his property for residential
use and can prove that fact, through a subdivision permit for
example, will receive compensation based on the value of his
property as farmland and as a residential subdivision for the
areas that are either actually used or will be soon for those
purposes.
Relatively, the dollar transfer affects each class of persons
uniformly. Each receives the value of the land in its actual
state taking into account the landowner's status which in turn
accounts for the landowner's reliance costs. An important part
of the alternative compensation system is that it measures actual use value in part by the status of the owner, thereby creating classes of owners. A farmer, for example, might be compensated at $1,000 per acre, a speculator at $1,500, and a
developer at $3,000. Each per acre figure reflects the costs and
expenditures of each landowner. The speculator will pay more
than the farmer and the developer more than the speculator
and respectively will have more expenditures in preparing the
land for its intended use. The system thus favors developers
over speculators and speculators over farmers as far as the absolute amount of dollars paid are concerned, but each receives
the same measure of compensation, compensation based on
actual value to the owner, thus avoiding the previously discussed disparity issue.
Is this allocation efficient? Is it fair? Both questions deserve affirmative answers. It is efficient because it avoids creating waste and because it directs money to those classes of
people with the demonstrated ability to best utilize the resource.58 It is fair because it seeks to insure that the affected
landowner gets what the land is actually worth to him. Finally, the alternative compensation system avoids awarding
windfalls to landowners fortunate enough to have their land
condemned, because compensation is not measured by the
overly generous highest and best use standard.
2. Productivity. How does the alternative compensation
system affect productivity? The efficiency principle simply
posits that a system which increases aggregate value is an effi58. Naturally, any given development may be inefficient, but it may be better to
give the money to the expert developer than to the inexpert farmer.
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cient one. At a base level, the Gross National Product serves
as an "efficiency index"'5 9 and is a readily identifiable positive
measure. Again, this theory holds that the bigger the pie, the
bigger the piece; hence, value is maximized, all other distributional and allocational rules being equal. This maximization,
however, may be more theoretical than real. Costs in some
areas have been known to rise and efficiency to decline even in
the face of an increasing GNP. In addition, the theory ignores
certain practical considerations. The productivity criterion
holds that production is efficient if we can produce more of
good A only by not producing less of good B. 0 Surely, the
aggregate value to society (at least as measured by GNP) has
risen, but has individual well-being risen as well? Does the
mere exercise of economic voting preferences bring happiness
to people? Price theory holds that consumers exercise their
market vote by their willingness to pay. Hence, the questions
become first, do consumers have an equal vote among themselves and second, do consumers as a class have equal or near
equal bargaining power relative to producers? The regulatory
state has been created because of a negative response to the
latter question.
Another significant problem with the productivity criterion is that in its stated form it ignores the law of diminishing
returns. Production is not a straight line; rather it is an Scurve at the top of which efficiency starts to diminish. Moreover, productivity as a criterion of efficiency is a short run explication of economic data ignoring long run consequences. Finally, the productivity criterion largely ignores externalities
and public costs, concentrating rather on the immediate consequences and private costs of a particular economic decision.
Assume, for example, that a parcel of land has the following values: As agricultural land, it is worth $1,000 per acre; as
single family residential, $2,000; as apartments at ten units
per acre, $10,000; and, as apartments at eight units per acre,
$8,000. The efficient choice measured by the productivity criterion would be apartments at ten units per acre because the
aggregate is increased. This naturally leads to queries concerning what type and quality of apartments are to be built?
What will the effects be on neighboring property? What is the
59.

WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 8, at 145.

60. Id.
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fiscal impact on the community?" On neighboring communities? The region? The state? How far does this go? Let us
assume that the ten unit apartment increases the value of the
parcel by $9,000 but reduces the value of the adjacent properties by $12,000. Is this an efficient decision? If not, will private arrangements take care to absorb these spillover costswill the surrounding property owners protect themselves by
buying out the apartment developer? Given the likelihood of
holdouts and freeloaders it seems highly unlikely.2 It is therefore argued that since private arrangements do not function
ideally, public controls can help the imperfect market reach a
more efficient result. Public controls, taxes, land use restrictions and the like, force the actors in the private market to
take cognizance of the costs (and benefits) 63 imposed on
others, thereby internalizing the externalities.6 4
Does the alternative compensation system satisfy the efficiency criterion and add to the aggregate welfare? The system
appears, at worse, to be benign and neutral. Payments are
made according to the amount of land transferred from the
restricted owner to the government. The amount, based on
the harm to a particular class of owners, is calculated to replace in dollars (or non-dollar rights) the value of the land
taken. As far as immediate productivity is concerned there
should be no gain or loss. The trade is even, unlike the present highest and best use principle which produces windfalls.
If we look at longer range consequences, we should ask
whether or not windfalls add to the GNP. If premiums are
given to those not in the best position to use the windfall it
may well be that some money will be wisely invested and
other money wasted.
61. Fiscal impact statements add another layer of regulations and should produce another corps of professionals. As far as land use decision making is concerned,
fiscal impact statements are grand scale cost-benefit analyses. It would appear at first
glance that they provide a significant source of hard positive data for decision making. The leaders in the field, however, are quick to point out the tentative and developmental nature of their work. Positive criteria must be coupled with an examination
of normative variables. See R. BURCHELL & D. LISTOKIN, FISCAL IMPACT HANDBOOK
(1978).
62. Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972). There may be other disincentives for private arrangements such as high transaction costs and lack of financial

wherewithall of the neighbors to put enough capital together.
63. WINDFALLS FOR WipEOUTs, supra note 8, at chs. 2 & 3.
64. Johnson, supra note 52, at 64, 74.
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Critics of such an even trade might argue that the alternative compensation system is an impediment to increased
productivity because it may keep the risk-averse out of the
market place. After all, why speculate or develop land when
that investment may yield a return based on reliance, not expectancy? Such a system discourages investment because it
does not promise a reasonable rate of return:
Purchasing land for development requires the expenditures of huge sums of money, much of which may
come in the form of loans from lenders who really seek a
specified return and not a windfall. Lenders will be deterred by the possibility of substantial future diminution
in value. It is likely therefore that as political risks increase, more potential investors, lenders, builders, and developers will drop out. Who, then, will build the houses,
apartments, supermarkets and industrial complexes?"
On the other hand, the market that relies on windfall incentives such as those produced by the highest and best use
principle can hardly be considered free. Rather it is another
form of middle (upper?) class welfare. It is likely that what
needs to be built will be built, and by more responsible investor-developers. Furthermore, the political risks involved in the
public control of land use decision-making are not purposely
aimed at particular developers or even at a class of developers.
Such paranoia is misplaced. There is no evidence that the
risks of land use restrictions are purposely aimed at particular
targets.
The alternative compensation system should not hamper
the output of goods and services. People in the business of
land development have economies of scale to protect. They
will keep working in order to keep their businesses going.
Should the government decide to restrict a particular parcel
of land under the proposed system, then the landowner is
compensated only at a lower rate than now exists. And under
this proposal the restricted landowner has a better chance of
receiving some compensation and should avoid the sort of
contradiction described earlier." With this proposal, there is
more predictability. Professor Michelman suggests that the
risks attendent with public land use controls are over stated:
65.
66.

Siegan, supra note 38, at 26.
See text accompanying notes 2-5 supra.
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We are thus led to inquire whether there is any reason to suppose that a visible risk of majoritarian exploitations should have any greater disincentive effect than the
ever-present risk that accidents may happen, this being

the only supposition which seems, on utilitarian premises,
7
to justify a constitutional former sort of risk.6

The visible risks can be insured against. The proposed compensation scheme offers a safeguard against accidents by
bringing some uniformity and predictability into this area of
the law. It merely reduces the amount awarded. Hence, there
is an element of protection for the risk-averse. Developers
should not be paralyzed or kept from the market by the uncertainty that a land use restriction under this proposal will
not earn them a windfall.
3. Administrative costs. The topic of administrative
costs today automatically raises the Coase theorem. 8 A discussion of administrative costs, transaction costs,19 or settlement costs7 0 proceeds along two lines. First, costs involved in
settling disputes either between private disputants or between
a public decision-making body and a private party are identified. If the settlement costs, for example, outweigh the supposed benefits of a decision, the decision is not one worthy of
implementation.7 1 The basis for such a statement comports
with the efficiency criterion-if administering the settlement
of a dispute or implementing a public land use control costs
more than it confers in benefits, then the decision is inefficient.71 Still, as discussed later on, criteria other than aggregate value maximizing can justify a seemingly inefficient
decision. 3
The second line of inquiry, and the basis of the Coase
theorem, deals with assigning liability rules. The argument is
that where cost-free bargaining could occur, an economically
67. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1216-17.
68. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. 1 (1960).
69. See, e.g., R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 46, at 133-46.
70. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1214-18.
71. Id. at 1215.
72. See B. FRIEDEN, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION HusTLE (1979). The rationale for land use controls is based on a belief that governmental controls can improve
the decisions made in the private market. What happens in the event of legislative
failure? Do we resort to the judiciary? See, e.g., Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. Rv. 1, 5-17 (1979).
73. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 39; Schwartz, supra note 49.
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efficient allocation of resources would be reached regardless of
where society places a liability rule. The paradigm is that of
the polluting factory which emits particulates and noxious
odors. 7' The Coase theorem argues that someone suffers a

"harm" no matter upon whom liability is placed. If the factory is permitted to pollute, then the surrounding neighbors
are harmed. If the neighbors are allowed to stop the pollution,
then the factory is harmed. This analysis uses a facile test for
"harm". Arguably the factory is not harmed because it loses
nothing, i.e. the factory has no legal right to pollute and hence
no liberty is denied the factory owner. Coase argues that, leaving ethical precepts aside, an efficient state is reached regardless of how liability is defined because the most effective cost
avoider will buy out the other interest. If it is less costly for
the factory to purchase the right to pollute, it will buy out the
surrounding property owner. If the homeowners can better
bear the cost, they will purchase the right to be free from pollution. The immediate problem with this analysis is that in
the first situation (the factory purchasing the right to pollute
from the homeowners) there may be holdouts among the
homeowners, thus raising the costs of settlement beyond actual value. In the reverse situation, some homeowners might
try to freeload, thereby raising the proportionate costs to
those homeowners willing to pay. 75 Thus, inequities appear.
Furthermore, it may be easier for one party of a dispute to
administer a settlement than it is for another. It may be
cheaper and easier for the factory to settle the dispute because it has a central management network and more working
capital for this sort of enterprise. The homeowners on the
other hand, may need to band together and incur management costs; and they may have a more difficult time than the
factory in accumulating enough capital to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the same amount of capital may be more valuable
74. This hypothetical also presents the problem of collective or public good,
that is, the factory is polluting the air which belongs not only to the property owner,
but to all who breathe. See, e.g., THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS 353-480 (H.

Manne ed. 1975). It can also be argued that the factory owner's legal right to pollute
and the homeowner's legal claim to be free from pollution are not conflicting legal
rights (the right to pollute versus the right to be free from pollution); rather, they are
correlative rights (the right to pollute is circumscribed by the right to be free from
pollution). See Tarlock, A CorrelativeRights Approach to the Taking Issue, in PLANNING WITHOUT PRICES, supra note 38, at 159.
75. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 62, at 1106-10.
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to the homeowners than it is to the factory.
Next, one must consider what administrative costs are involved with the alternative compensation scheme and whether
the burden of those costs falls more heavily on one party than
another. The system does involve ongoing transaction costs.
Once a goal is defined, agricultural land preservation for example, it is necessary to develop a standard to determine
when and how much compensation is due. Once the standards
are developed, individual parcels must be evaluated.
There are essentially three systems of compensable regulations that can be coupled with an alternative compensation
system. Transaction costs depend on the type of compensable
regulations chosen. These costs can be borne either by private
parties in the marketplace or by a public body such as a court
or administrative agency. Whether or not the transaction
costs go beyond the value of the prospective benefits to be
conferred, and whether the burden falls on a particular side
depends on the type of system chosen. Given a system in
which the transactions take place in the private market, the
transaction costs are freely bargained for and need not concern us. Given a system in which the government functions as
arbiter, the costs are spread among the taxpayers and are de
minimus vis 6 vis any one party.
There is no guarantee, however, that some governmental
decisions will not be inefficient. The government may decide,
for example, to restrict a parcel of land, resulting in a diminution in value of $1,000. The landowner may challenge the legality of the regulation and the amount of the lost value.
When the landowner's challenges have run their course, she
may have spent in excess of the claimed $1,000, and the cost
to the government may also exceed that sum. Hopefully, such
improvident challenges will be rare. Nevertheless, even when
such a system cannot be soundly defended on grounds of efficiency, non-efficiency criteria may justify allowing such suits.
Everyone, after all, is entitled to her day in court.
B. Equity Criteria
In our discussion of the three efficiency criteria the acid
test was whether or not the specific criterion was value-maximizing. The alternative compensation system was then measured against that standard. A similar touchstone exists for
so-called equity criteria: Does the criterion treat people with
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equality?7 6 Is it fair? 7" Further, can a result be "fair" even
though the net social product is not maximized and hence the
efficiency criteria are not satisfied.
The hardest conflict is between efficiency and equity.
Given outcome A which is fair but inefficient and outcome B
which is unfair but efficient, which is to be preferred? And by
whom? Individual? Legislator? Judge? Note that the alternative compensation system is intended to be legislatively implemented. It is not within the scope of this article to develop
a theory of legislation that resolves this conflict. Moreover, efficiency issues and equity issues are not discrete and insular.
But for a given legislator the question is political and the
choice is difficult. What is meant by denominating the choice
between outcomes based on positive efficiency criteria and
those based on normative equity criteria a political question?
Some suggest that such conflicts must be resolved with reference to a larger context, the legislator's comprehensive view, 7
for example, or the legislator's view of her role in relationship
to her constituency. A given legislator may have ordered her
decision-making parameters in such a way that empirical efficiency criteria take precedence over intuitive or rational
equity criteria. We should not ask more of her here than that
her ordering be reasonable.7 '
1. Distribution of wealth and income. The state in a
given compensation system is responsible for distributing resources whether the resources are in the form of dollars or
legal rights that can be valued in terms of dollars.80 Fair and
equal distribution of these benefits is the problem of distribu76. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTC §§ 3, 11, 13, 14 (1971); Michelman,
supra note 2, at 1220.
77. J. RAWLS, supra note 76, §§ 1-9; Michelman, supra note 2, at 1219.
78. See, e.g., B. AcKERmAN, supra note 2, at 41-87. Ackerman's discussion relates to a judge's comprehensive view of the law, legal institutions and his role and
function within the system. One may argue that legislators who deal with the compensation issue must do so in the context of a similar comprehensive or philosophical
view. The alternative compensation system presented here, for example, should be
examined in the context of how we think and talk about property and how we think
and talk about the state in relationship to the individual.
79.

See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 76, § 8.

80. For example, a landowner might complain that a regulation is value depressing and the government may, instead of paying actual dollars, offer tax abatement or lessen the restrictions on the parcel in question or transfer a legal right from

the restricted parcel to another parcel which has a dollar value. Transferable development rights are a form of non-dollar compensation that can be sold in a marketplace.
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tive justice"1 against which the alternative compensation system must be measured. Note the parallel between this equitable principle and the efficiency criterion of allocation which
held that an allocation was efficient as long as it was value
maximizing and no one was worse off after regulation. Here a
distribution can be said to be fair and equitable as long as
proportionately,8 2 even though
compensation is distributed
83
value is not maximized.
Proportionality of distribution is only one factor in
weighing the fairness of distributions. One might assume that,
given an imbalance of wealth and political power in society,
an equalitarian or Robin Hood distribution8 4 that takes from
the rich and gives to the poor may be "fair," and in the long
run will tend toward equality. Does this Robin Hood principle
carry with it "side constraints"8 5 such as work incentives or
disincentives? 8 6 Still, another problem is that end-state disand thus intribution patterns may prove to be too inflexible
87
autonomy.
and
liberty
individual
fringe on
Essentially, the core of the compensation question is distribution.8 8 The proposed compensation scheme does effect a
redistribution of wealth. Instead of the uniform highest and
best use compensation principle which is tied to the parcel of
land in question, the alternative shifts emphasis to the landowner. Accordingly, classes of people will be treated differently. The highest and best use principle may have its genesis
in a species of egalitarianism because it treats all landowners
equally. The Farmer, Speculator, and Developer, with few ex81. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHARN ETHICS bk. 5 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962); J.
RAWLS, supra note 76, §§ 41-50; R. NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA ch. 7 (1974).

82. ARISTOTLE, supra note 81, at 118-20. Aristotle bases his discussion of distributive justice on the "principle 'To each according to his desserts.'" Id. at 118.
This coincides with the dessert theory of property. See Michelman, supra note 2, at
1203-05; L. BECKER, supra note 9, at 49-56. See also R. NOZICK, supra note 81, at 154-

55.
83.

See note 35 supra.

84.

Wealth and political power are linked here because access to political insti-

tutions in an activist state can affect one's wealth. See WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS,
supra note 8, at 155-58.
85. R. NOZICK, supra note 81, at 29-33.
86. A deeper problem is that "the language of wealth distribution is often awkward and is quite capable of obscuring or distorting a genuine justice issue."
Schwartz, supra note 49, at 811.
87. R. NOZICK, supra note 81, at 153-60.
88. "Redistribution" is a more accurate term, but the principles discussed here
are identical. See Michelman, supra note 2, at 1208.
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ceptions, receive the same amount of compensation. Yet to
accept this measure as fair because there is equal payment is
to ignore both efficiency and equity criteria. The proposed alternative does not pay the Farmer, Speculator, and Developer
an equal amount; it does pay each equally according to his
desserts: production, expenditures, ability, and reliance. The
fairness of the alternative compensation scheme stems from
the inherently equal treatment of classes of persons; the proposal comports with the proportionality principle of distributive justice. While the Farmer may get less than the Developer, he receives payment equivalent to that which was
"taken" from him. Developers are favored only insofar as absolute dollars are concerned, yet the relative value of the dollars, given the risks the Developer takes and the expenditures
he makes in reliance, may be less than the relative value to
the Farmer. Most likely, the relative values will be similar. In
any event, the proposal seeks to avoid windfalls and wipeouts,
both of which treat the landowner unequally and hence
unfairly.
2. Arguments from felicity.8 9 Society strives for the
good, the summum bonum, and the state, as an agent of the
populace, too, seeks this end. For our purposes, the state's
compensation principle should also satisfy this desire for felicity. But, there are myriad ways hypothecated by which this
result might be achieved. Three formulas that have been proposed for compensation systems are mentioned below, followed by an assessment of the one principally under
consideration.
Professor Michelman's utility formula provides a fitting
starting point." In his taxonomy, "efficiency gains" are the
dollar benefits gainers are willing to pay over the dollar
amount losers insist on as compensation. "Demoralization
costs" are the dollars necessary to offset the realization that
no compensation is forthcoming, once a land use decision is
implemented, and the capitalized value of lost future production is determined. Finally, "settlement costs" are the dollars
needed to avoid demoralization costs through a compensation
89. This subtitle is a loose one. Happiness is only indirectly involved in the
discussion. Formulations of compensation systems that seek to avoid unhappiness
and dissatisfaction are actually under scrutiny.
90. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1214-18. See also Developments in the
Law-Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1427, 1486-97.
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settlement. The following rules emerge from these definitions
and from Professor Michelman's allegiance to utilitarianism:
When pursuit of efficiency gains entails capricious redistribution, either demoralization costs or settlement
costs must be incurred. It follows that if, for any measure,
both demoralization costs and settlement costs (which
ever were chosen) would exceed efficiency gains, the measure is to be rejected; but that otherwise, since either demoralization costs or settlement costs must be paid, it is
the lower of these two costs which should be paid. The
compensation rule which then clearly emerges is that settlement costs are lower than both demoralization costs
and efficiency gains. But if settlement costs, while lower
than demoralization costs, exceed efficiency gains, then
the measure is improper regardless of whether compensation is paid. The correct utilitarian statement, then, insofar as the issue of compensability is concerned, is that

compensation is due whenever demoralization costs exceed settlement costs, and not otherwise.91

Thus stated, the primary concern is the avoidance of demoralization costs either through compensation or through
the implementation of a land-use decision that entails net efficiency gains.
Professor Ackerman provides a gloss on Michelman's utility formula in his "Utilitarian Comprehensive View."' 92 Acker-

man's formula is similar to, in fact derived from, Michelman's
and his taxonomy is similar. The "Appeal to General Uncertainty" argument is based on the fact that when an institution
makes a decision that increases the level of uncertainty costs
(U), another form of disability called citizen disaffection (D)
is present that imposes costs on society. Lastly, process costs
(P) are the costs incurred in administering the system. To a
restrained judge in Ackerman's universe, "If P > U + D,
compensation should be denied; if P < U + D, it should be
granted." 9
Ackerman offers us another comprehensive view from
which to choose-a Kantian model.94 This model requires
91. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1215.
92. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 41-70.
93. Id. at 48. Other formulations are possible, indeed encouraged, in Ackerman's book depending on a judge's view of role. Activist and reformist judges will
have different interpretations of the formula.
94. Although he says it is possible to imagine "any number of Comprehensive
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compensation "when P<B-C, where P is process cost, B is
project benefit, and C is other projects costs. ' '95 The easy case
for the Kantian model occurs when process costs are less than
net project benefits-then compensation is due. The underlying premise is that, to the Kantian judge, people are ends in
themselves and that larger ends other than maximizing social
utility exist."
The formulas described above are shorthand methods for
determining when compensation is due and as such they need
not concern us beyond their ability to illuminate the compensation problem. These three examples of felicific calculus do,
however, illustrate certain things. First, the calculations indicate that efficiency is not a dispositive parameter. Efficiency
may or may not be taken into account, and when taken into
account, can be weighted differently. Second, the formulas relate to a higher, more generalized and more abstract statement about compensation systems calling for reference to
more comprehensive philosophies. Finally, the formulas attempt to work out accommodations insofar as they account
for benefits and harms to individuals and society, and costs to
governments.
The alternative compensation system has like reference
points. It does take efficiency into account on both sides of
the equation, and does so in the long run. On the developers'
side, efficiency occurs on the theory that a lesser amount of
compensation should have the effect of deterring inefficient
developers or high risk takers from entering the market place.
Those developers interested in a quick, high return on their
investment will be greatly disappointed, since the compensation they will receive is likely to do little more than cover
their investment. On the government's side of the equation
(which is also the taxpayers' side), the system is designed to
provide increased fiscal resources and legitimate authority to
make land use decisions. These decisions will cost less 9 7 and
Views" such as Marxist, Maoist, Existentialist, or Absurdist the Utilitarian and Kantian views predominate. Id. at 41.
95. Id. at 74.
96. Id. at 72. See Soper, supra note 2, for a brief critique of Ackerman's use of
the term "Kantian."
97. Naturally, if this proposal is adopted across the board and every value-depressing regulation is held to require compensation, the system will break down. It is
imperative that the proposal be added to the police and eminent domain powers
rather than supplant them.
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the government will be free to expand and experiment in the
area of land use decision making. This should promote efficiency by avoiding the contradictary results reached under
present law.
Because this represents an expansion of government
power and because it requires a change in the existing legal
order, there must be an accompanying statement of philosophy or policy. Basically, the alternative scheme is grounded in
a philosophy of stewardship and responsible growth and development.98 Land development utilizing a private market
may or may not be efficient. Assuming that it is efficient, this
is so only in the short run. Furthermore, private market decisions do not adequately assess correlative rights. Nor does the
private market, which is intended to measure productivity
alone, take non-efficiency criteria adequately into account. In
the vein of Kantian analysis we can ask: "Is the land merely a
means of production or is it something more, something that
is an end in itself?" 9 In agricultural land use, for example, it
may be immediately efficient to increase yields through the
use of higher technologies, but there may well be a resultant
increase in soil erosion and soil depletion. Likewise, it may be
efficient to increase the size of one's farm, thereby decreasing
the number of "family farms"100 but a viable subculture is
eliminated thereby. It may be extremely efficient to sell one's
farmland to a developer 01 rather than maintain it as a farm,
but there are still real losses on the other side of the ledger.
The alternative compensation system is intended as an accommodation between the private harms, public benefits, and
costs to government entailed by governmental measures to
protect natural resources.
3. Acquisition and transfer rules. Rather than concentrate on a substantive policy, it might be desirable instead to
develop a procedure or set of procedures designed to facilitate
See E. SCHUMACHER, supra note 47, at 95-109 (1973); B. WARD, PROGRESS
PLANET (1979); T. ROSZAK, PERSON/PLANw 31-59 (1978); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW § 216 (1977).
99. E. SCHUMACHER, supra note 47, at 98.
100. The Family Farm: A Statement of the Committee on Social Development
and World Peace, United States Catholic Conference (Feb. 14, 1979).
101. See, e.g., Thomasson, Connecticut Pays $252,000 to PreserveMan's Farm,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1979, at 30, col. 1.
98.

FOR A SMALL
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the acquisition"'2 and transfer" 3 of property in a manner that
is fair and equitable. Michelman's principle of fairness and
compensation, which is derived from Rawls, makes this argument and is independent of value maximizing criteria.' 4"
Rawls finds that two fundamental principles would
emerge from this convention of the circumspect. The first
principle is a general presumption that social arrangements should accord no preferences to anyone, but should
assure to each participant the maximum liberty consistent with a like liberty on the part of every other participant. The second principle defined a justification for
departures from the first: an arrangement entailing differences in treatment is just so long as (a) everyone has a
chance to attain the positions to which differential treatments attach, and (b) the arrangement can reasonably be
supposed to work out to the advantage of every participant, and especially the one to whom accrues the least
advantageous treatment provided for by the arrangement
in question. 00
What is crucial is that the alternative compensation policy be governed by a set of rules that provides equal opportunity among different classes.' 0 e Such a rules-oriented system
may also be justified because of the difficulty or impossibility
of verifying the behavioral and psychological assumptions on
which the other efficiency and equity criteria rest. The proposal here does not contain any procedural rules at this stage.
They will come once a particular property regime is established that can apply the alternative compensation system. If,
for example, the alternative compensation system is to be
102. See, e.g., L. BECKER, supra note 9, ch. 9; R. NOZICK, supra note 81, at 17482.
103. See, e.g., R. NOZICK, supra note
supra note 8, at 162-69.

81, at

167-74; WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS,

104. Michelman, supra note 2, at 1219-24.
105. Id. at 1220. From these principles Michelman develops a substantive compensability criterion:
A decision not to compensate is not unfair as long as the disappointed claimant ought to be able to appreciate how such decisions
might fit into a consistent practice which holds forth a lesser long-run
risk to people like him than would any consistent practice which is naturally suggested by the opposite direction.
Id. at 1223.
106. There are other values involved. Rules that favor the status quo or
"Burkean" rules may be seen as conservative. See Michelman, supra note 39, at 1041.
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applied to agricultural land and open space preservation, rules
would be developed to protect classes of interested landowners fairly and equitably.
C. The Normative Context of Compensable Regulations and
the Alternative Compensative System
1. Of takings and regulations. In the discussion of the
legal environment surrounding just compensation or takings
law, it was argued that governmental activities in the land-use
field have been traditionally confined to either the police
power/regulation category or the eminent domain box. Likewise, discussion of the value issues, value in the normative or
ethical sense, also can be grouped into these classifications.
The discussion of normative issues centers on the question of government involvement in land-use decisionmaking.
The philosophical discussion concerns creation of a land-use
ethic which attempts to resolve the question of whether or not
government involvement in land use is "good." In this section
very brief, and consequently over-simplified, accounts will be
given of the ethical and normative bases of takings law and
the bases for governmental regulations. Next, a subsection is
devoted to an examination of a land ethic which is compatible
with the emerging law of compensable regulations.
a. Takings. The most vocal proponents of a compensable takings jurisprudence are economically motivated and
strongly in favor of a laissez-faire posture in land use.10 7 The
government should stay out of the land use, development, and
preservation business, they argue, and the market will work
out the most effective allocation of this resource. '08 As a corollary, if the government does decide to step in, it must pay the
landowner for any restrictions the government imposes on the
land. 109 Most of the reasons for such a posture are laudatory
but not entirely clear, except perhaps to a confirmed libertarian. It is argued that by forcing the government to pay for its
value-depressing activities, private property, personal autonomy, and separation of state and individual will be pre107.
108.

See Costonis, supra note 12, at 1026-33.
R. Pos1zsm, supra note 39, §§ 2.5, 23.1.

109. B. ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 2, 156. This is a simple and extreme view of
the taking clause and, as Professor Ackerman points out, is not seriously taken by
anyone.
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served. 110 On a more pragmatic level, requiring the government to pay in these situations will encourage investment,
development, and competition, all of which will result in a
more efficient allocation of resources.111 This position really
speaks more directly to a philosophy of state than to a landuse ethic. Those who advocate that the government should
pay for its value-depressing activities are really arguing for a
broader agenda-keeping government out of the land-use
business."'i

b. Regulations. Cast opposite the free marketeers are
those who would give the government more freedom to operate within the police power. 113 This means, naturally, that
with broader police powers the government can do more to
protect the environment and otherwise involve itself in landuse decision making without paying for it. The arguments in
favor of more regulation without compensation center on the
notion of land as a scarce resource requiring governmental
protection.
The most recent and notorious advocates of the pro-regulation position are the authors of The Taking Issue. " At one
point the authors suggest a simple solution to the takings
problem by limiting the instances that require compensation
to physical takings: "A return to this simple and unsophisticated principle would go a long way toward upholding the type
of environmental protection currently needed."11 The Taking
Issue and its adherents base their position on the need for
protection and a strict construction"' of the taking clause in
favor of "heavyweight public purposes. '1117
In an earlier work,11 8 two of the authors of The Taking

Issue chronicle what they characterize as a "new concept of
110. Seigan, supra note 38, at 22-25.
111. Id. at 25-28.
112. Id. at 156. See also Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic

and Legal Analysis, 86 YALz L.J. 385 (1977); Elickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 681
(1973).
113.
114.
115.

116.
117.
81 YALz
118.

See Costonis, supra note 12, at 1024-26.
F. BosSmBu, D. CALLms & J. BANTA, supra note 2.
Id. at 255.

Id. at 238-55.
Id. at 260-65. See also Sax, Takings, Private Propertyand Public Rights,
L.J. 149 (1971).
F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLmS, THz QuiET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CoNmOL

(1971).
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land." 119 Indeed, how society deals with, defines, and talks
about property changes with the times 12 0 The very topic of
this article, alternatives to the existing compensation system,
supports this fact. The questions become how, in what direction, and to what extent is our concept of real property
changing?
The Quiet Revolution, cited above, does point out the
direction of our changing attitude:
Basically, we are drawing away from the 19th century
idea that land's only function is to enable its owner to
make money... As we increasingly understand the science of ecology and the web of connections between the
use of any particular piece of land and the impact on the
environment as a whole we increasingly see the need to
protect wet lands and other areas that were formerly
ignored.
This concern over the interrelatedness of land uses had
led to a recognition of the need to deal with entire ecological systems rather than small segments of them....
The new attitude toward land can also be seen reflected
in the increasing concern about its scarcity. 11
The new concept of land can be characterized as one that
views land as a resource as well as a commodity. In addition,
this concept admits a series of connections and interconnections between ownership and use of land. Since what one does
with one's land affects others, land-use decisions by individuals in a private property regime ignore both the costs and benefits imposed and conferred on others. Since these externalities are ignored, public controls are needed."' The new
conceptualists, as defined in this section, argue that the social
costs of private choice are too great to be left unregulated.
The fear is that in the short run, private choices opt for inefficient, intensive uses of land and that in the long run, the efficiency of their resources will not be maximized. Rather, the
more efficient use of land is not to develop or to limit development in the name of ecosystem stability. Their position is
119.

Id. at 314.

120. See, e.g., Reich, supra note 9; B.

ACKERMAN,

supra note 2; and, Philbrick,

supra note 9.
121. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLmS, supra note 118, at 314-15.

122. Johnson, Planning Without Prices: A Discussion of Land Use Regulation
Without Compensation, in PLANNING WrrHouT PRICES, supra note 38, at 63.
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supported by the argument that even if property rights are
based on the protection of expectations, e.g., expectations of
gain, it is not fair to let one landowner utilize choices freely.
Competing expectations exist, as do correlative rights, which
must be recognized and accommodated.' Given the seriousness of both positions, compensable regulations can take the
strengths of each in formulating an ethic which permits
accommodations.
The Taking Issue contains the seeds of two significant
changes in legal and philosophical attitudes toward land.
Legally, the old framework is no longer functional. A new
system must be designed to replace the old order, and that
system must be responsive to what is perceived to be a new
concept. These legal accommodations can be made in the
guise of compensable regulations that are also alternative
compensation systems. The system is based on the premise
that the government cannot render one's land valueless or
even nearly so. Yet the hands of the government cannot be
restrained, nor can legislation designed for the public benefit
be invalidated, because no alternatives are presented. Here,
following Professor Costonis, 1 4 and Professor Hagman, 2 5 it is
argued that a middle ground exists, that the government
should be able to exercise a legitimate intermediate power
which affords less than the technical just compensation measure now used.
Professor Costonis keys this third power, which he calls
the "accommodation power," to the economic return of which
the land is capable. By way of example, suppose the government describes a category of land-use controls to which the
accommodation power will be applied-for instance, the protection of prime agricultural land. The government then
creates a set of controls and imposes them on particular landowners. Assuming that such a categorization fulfills a legitimate public purpose, if the land is incapable of earning a reasonable economic return, then a payment to the landowner is
made up to the reasonable economic return, rather than the
123.

Tarlock, A CorrelativeRights Approach to the Taking Issue, in

PLANNING

WrrHoUT PRIcEs, supra note 38, at 159, 168.

124.

Costonis, supra note 12; for a critique see Berger, The Accommodation

Power in Land Use Controversies:A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REv.
799 (1976).
125. WINDFALLS FOR WIP EoUs, supra note 8, ch. 11.
HeinOnline -- 21 Santa Clara L. Rev. 124 1981

19811

COMPENSABLE REGULATIONS

highest and best use level. Under Costonis' scheme, the landowner's reasonable expectations are satisfied and the government's side is protected.12 Exact measurements can be legislatively and administratively devised.
There is a practical advantage in developing this alternative power through legislative enactments and administrative
actions rather than through judicial decisions (e.g., inverse
condemnation suits). There will be resources allocated
through public planning initiatives rather than by licensing
discordant private development; categories of protected resources will be enunciated; and, the true costs of resource allocation and regulation should surface. Further, individual liberty will be more clearly protected against over-ambitious
governmental intrusiveness.1 2 7 Alternative systems, then, are a
compromise:
Private litigants should not be permitted to compel government to compensate for overbroad regulatory measures; but to deal fairly with landowners and to enhance
the prospect for effective regulation, government should
resort to the accommodation power whenever it recognizes beforehand that restrictions it imposes may not be
defineable [sic] under the police power.12s
Qualitative and normative principles also support alternative systems. It was earlier shown that traditional legal categories present anomalies which should be alleviated. Ethical
arguments augment the legal and pragmatic reasons for so
doing.
An extension of the normative posture of the new concept
discussed above can be found in the ideals of trusteeship and
stewardship.

29

No one really "owns" the land in the popular

sense. Rather, we are all renters. Land ownership is short-run
and resources must be preserved for future generations. High
intensity usage threatens to significantly impair the prospects
126. Costonis, supra note 12, at 1049-55. There are alternative measurements,
see Tomain, supra note 33, at 319-22.
127. Costonis, supra note 12, at 1053, 1071-81.

128. Id. at 1073.
129. Anthan & Muhm, Save the Land as God's Stewards, John Paul says in
Iowa Message, Des Moines Reg., Oct. 5, 1979, at 1, col. 2; Dingman & Hart, Wanted:
U.S. Land Redistribution, National Catholic Rep., Oct. 5, 1979, at 11. This idea of
trusteeship and protection of natural resources for future generations was the central
focus of Pope John Paul II's Midwest visit.
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of future development. Legal rules that favor concentration of
ownership, encourage intense short-run development, and reward developers' highest expectations are counterproductive
in the long run.130 Carried further, legal rules designed to promote land ownership across a broader base of the populace
encourage individual responsibility for land use, promote individual liberty, and encourage a return to sought after values
inherent in a manner consistent with family farming and rural
life.181 It is hoped that a rational system of land preservation
can forestall the alienation of farmer from farmland and the
depersonalization brought on by mindless technology.1 2
These are the hopes of individuals who advocate a more personalized view' 88 of land use, a view that makes room for
human dignity while honoring private ownership with responsible government supervision.
The alternative compensation system represents a legal
and ethical middle road. Normatively, the values inherent in
such a system lie between a libertarian or laissez faire attitude of no government involvement unless the government
pays for its intrusion, and a socialism which posits that the
government can do almost anything in the name of the public
good without compensation.' 8
The alternative, by its very nature, does not guarantee
that the land ethic described will be achieved. The consequences will depend on how the particular techniques and
methodology is designed. A system of transferable development rights, for example, could be created that encourages the
accumulation of large land holdings and promotes intense development, thus frustrating a trusteeship ethic. Nevertheless,
the existence of compensable regulations coupled with a reformulated compensation policy gives the government another
tool with which to implement a more comprehensive land use
policy.
130. Strangers and Guests: Toward Community in the Heartland, Draft Statement of the Catholic Bishops of Regions VII, VIII, IX, (copies available from National Catholic Rural Life Conference, Des Moines, 1979).
131. See, e.g., Berglund's Call for a New Look at Family Farm and How to
Save it, Des Moines Reg., Mar. 26, 1979, at 14a.
132. E. SCHUMACHER, supra note 47, at 95-109.
133. T. ROSZAK, supra note 98, at 31-59.
134. L. BECKER, supra note 9, ch. 9.
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COMPENSABLE REGULATIONS AND AN ALTERNATIVE

COMPENSATION SYSTEM APPLIED: AGRICULTURAL LAND

Agricultural land is a finite and increasingly scarce resource. Although statistics indicate that the market is not doing an effective job of preserving farmlands, it is entirely possible to preserve the better agricultural tracts. The market is
hastening the loss of land through market incentives that foster large-scale production with consequent increased soil erosion and the lure of large profits gained by selling the land for
development.
Government, whether federal, state, or local, does not
have a comprehensive land-use policy for farmland preservation. In fact, farmland preservation is a hodge-podge of devices that are only starting to be applied. " Not only does the
lack of a comprehensive government policy hinder agricultural
land preservation, the existing legal concept of land use also
hinders the development and implementation of a truly workable farmland preservation policy.
It is beyond debate that agriculture is a key industry for
the nation. In addition, few would contest that a need exists
for a land preservation and development policy to ensure that
finite land resources, natural areas, and valuable agricultural
lands are utilized, preserved, and protected for the benefit of
both present and future generations.' 5 Yet to state the issue
so simply and to agree that this is a shared consensus is to
ignore the delicate balances, trade-offs, and countervailing
forces that lie beneath the surface of an agricultural land
preservation policy.
The amount of land devoted to agriculture is expected to
decline.13 7 On a per farm basis the number of farms is declin135. See Meyers, The Legal Aspects of Agricultural Districting,55 IND. L.J. 1
(1979); B. Davis & J. Belden, A Survey of State Programs to Preserve Farmland (pre-

pared pursuant to CEQ grant, April 1979).
136. See Temporary State Land Preservation Policy Commission, Mar. 1, 1979
(Iowa Land Preservation and Development Policy Interim Report). R. Blobaum, The
Loss of Agricultural Land: A Study Report to the Citizen's Advisory Committee on
Environmental Quality (1974); Note, Assessment to Preserve Agricultural Land, 47
U. Mo. KAN. Cri L. R.v. 629-32 (1979).
137. R. Blobaum, supra note 136, at 1-5. Statistics show that the nation can no

longer count on a rise in productivity and increased high yields, see H.R. Rap. No. 951400, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-10 (1978). See also Pedersen, Iowa's Land: Our People,
Our Future, Des Moines Reg., Apr. 8, 1979, at A-i; Parker, Farm Land Squeezed in
Urban-Rural Vise, Des Moines Reg., July 15, 1979; Krause & Hair, Trends in Land
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ing and the average size of a single farm is increasing. Until
recently, the reduction in the number of acres devoted to agriculture was not considered a threat because productivity per
acre was on the rise. Increasing productivity can no longer be
taken for granted."8
The reduced growth of productivity is attributable to two
major trends: First, the significant increase in the use of fertilizer and increased mechanization has resulted in soil losses.,
Second, competing land uses are taking prime and unique
farmlands out of production. 140 At present reserve lands available for farm production still exists; however, note that in
1974 it was estimated that the country had 266 million acres
of reserve farmland, but the number dropped precipitously to
111 million in 1978.141
Thus, as population rises, as the desire to develop continues, and as conversion of prime agricultural land results, responsible preservation techniques deserve serious consideration. A responsible preservation policy can accommodate
agricultural and non-agricultural users as long as the lands
that are taken out of agricultural production are not prime
lands. A preservation policy must also guard against adopting
farming methods that increase the tendency for soil erosion or
142
depletion.
The effect of the above-stated developments on the cost
of farmland cannot be ignored or overstated. Costs are
skyrocketing as "landflation" heats up.'4 8 This has two noteworthy consequences: First, entry costs are growing rapidly. It
is estimated that a new farmer would need $172,392 to finance
Use and Competition For Land to Produce Food and Fiber, in Perspectives on Prime
Lands (1975) (U.S. Dept. Agriculture).
138. Anthan, Feeding Our Hungry World From Less and Less Farm Land, Des
Moines Reg., July 8, 1979; Anthan, Land, People Trends Hint at Food 'Disaster,'Des

Moines Reg., July 9, 1979, [hereinafter cited as Anthan I and Anthan II respectively];
R. Blobaum, supra note 136, at 5.

139. R. Blobaum, supra note 136, at 5. See also Betts, Soil Conservation: Saving Our Number One Resource, USDA SonL CONSERVATION SERVICE, IOWA FARM
BUREAU SPOKESMAN, June 16, 1979, at 2A.
140. R. Blobaum, supra note 136; Krause & Hair, supra note 137.
141. Anthan II, supra note 138. See also Note, Regulatory Authority to Mandate Soil Conservation in Iowa After Ortner, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1035 (1980).
142. "Acid rain" caused by increased urbanization and industrialization has a
detrimental effect on soil fertility, animals, crops, and human health. See, e.g., Webster, Acid Rain: An Increasing Threat, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1979, at C1.
143. Pedersen, supra note 137. See generally note 136 supra.
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the land and equipment necessary to start operation of a 240
acre farm. 1 " Second, it is becoming increasingly attractive for
farmers to sell their land for development."4 Legislative activity or regulation must take notice of these delicate financial
and ecological balances.
What follows is not an exhaustive list of techniques that
may be classified as compensable regulations since redefinition of terms will produce infinite variations. When the government, for example, grants tax relief to a particular landowner or group of landowners in exchange for the imposition
of some land-use regulation, this could properly be classified
as a compensable regulation. Restrictive covenants, subdivision regulations, or variances that are used with some element
of compensation would also fall into this category.
This article will focus on specific devices that have fairly
unique characteristics: transferable development rights
(TDR's), easements, and a procedural mechanism. After
describing each device, its legal status will be noted. Finally,
the interrelationship of these techniques for preserving agricultural lands will be explained with reference to more or less
direct controls (zoning and eminent domain, and tax assessment respectively) to construct a comprehensive and workable
4e
scheme.
A.

Transferable Development Rights

Basically, a development right permits the property owner to build upon or develop his land. In an urbanizing region
it is usually the owners' most valuable property right.'4 7 In
our legal system when we discuss a particular land-use regula144. Anthan I, supra note 138. This is a smaller than average farm which is
estimated to be 393 acres nationally. Anthan, Pressures Mount on Farmers to Sell
'Last Cash Crop,' Des Moines Reg., July 10, 1979, [hereinafter cited as Anthan III).
145. Anthan III, supra note 144.
146. This article concentrates on devices that have been denominated compensable regulations. Zoning is a strict police power device and no compensation is required. Eminent domain, naturally, requires compensation based on the highest and

best use principle. A truly effective agricultural land preservation system would combine these techniques and supplement them with a responsible tax policy. See
Meyers, supra note 135.
147. B. Chavooshian, T. Norman, & G. Nieswand, Transfer of Development
Rights: A New Concept in Land Use Management, Leaflet 492-A, 7 (1975) (Cook

College Cooperative Extension Service, Rut.-State U. of N.J.). See also J. Helb, B.
Chavooshian & G. Nieswand, Development Rights Bibliography, Leaflet 533 (1976).
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tion or control, we are talking about how the right to develop
land is being affected. No landowner has an absolute right to
develop his land, since, even in the absence of specific legislation, the system derived from common law imposes an obligation on the landowner to refrain from injuring his neighbor.
The Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use
your property in such a manner as not to injure that of another) states the guiding principle of land use controls generally recognized at common law. Today, however, we have
moved from reliance on judge-made land-use controls to more
specific, legislative ones. "1 8
The concept of transferable development rights permits
development rights to be split off from a particular parcel and
transferred "to land where more intense development will not
be objectionable. '"I" The desired result is protection of the
threatened resource on the restricted site while allowing the
landowner to recoup the economic value represented by the
site's frozen potential. 15 0
TDR systems can be administered by either the private
marketplace or a governmental entity. The basic procedure
involved in the design of a privately operated TDR system is
relatively straightforward. It consists of six basic steps."'1 It is
somewhat of a misnomer to label this a "private" system, because the government creates the TDR's. The reference is to
the private sale and purchase of rights rather than through
government sale and purchase. The first step involves identification of those lands that are to be preserved; but there are
preliminary decisions that need to be made prior to this identification process. First, a time frame for the designation of
prime agricultural land that will be affected by the TDR system must be established (that is, will only that land which is
in immediate danger of development fall under the plan, or
will land that is in potential danger of development within an
undetermined period also be included). The other preliminary
decision that needs to be made is what exactly constitutes
148. In either event land use controls are directed to the landowner's development rights and such a right is truly a property interest.
149. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE
L.J. 75, 86 (1973).
150. Id. at 85.
151. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, TRANSFERABLE DEvLoPMENT RIGHTS 39 (1977).
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prime agricultural land. Once the preliminary questions are
resolved the actual process of mapping can begin.
The second step in the six-step process involves a determination of the capacity or development potential of the affected land. If the land is already zoned, this can be a relatively simple process because the restrictions are already in
existence. The development potential calculation can be based
on what could be built under that ordinance. Once again,
however, it may be advisable to actually examine the proposed restricted parcels to determine what sort of development would be likely to occur there. Ironically, prime agricultural land is also often a most attractive site for intensive
development because of its deep soils, good drainage, resistance to erosion and slight slopes. 15' As a result, care must be
taken to recognize patterns of development so that controls
can be used to channel rather than frustrate development.
After the designation is completed, the third step necessitates the establishment of a system whereby landowners can
be compensated for the frozen or taken development potential
that was calculated in the second step. This aspect of the system provides for allocation of the development rights to be
transferred. The system could operate on a straight acreage
basis, but this would ignore valuing development potentials.
The New Jersey Legislature, for example, chose to base its
calculation on the ratio between the value of the particular
parcel to the total value of the preservation zone. 158 This allocation system should lead to a more equitable distribution of
development rights than the straight acreage system, and it
should be easier to administer.
The fourth step involves locating areas within the municipality, county, or region that can serve as receiving districts
for the transferable development rights. This is the most crucial and difficult step in implementing the TDR system. The
transfer area must be the most developable land in the area
outside the preserved prime agricultural land. It must be an
area that is or will soon be served by an infrastructure, and it
should be the most lucrative site possible. If the transfer area
is so defined, then development will be channeled rather than
152. Roe, Innovative Techniques to Preserve Rural Land Resources, 5 ENvT'L
Amp. 419, 420 (1976).
153. NATIONAL CONFERENCE, supra note 151, at 45.
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frustrated and the development potential of the affected area
will be maximized. Also, by designating as a transfer area land
that is second only in its development potential to the land
designed to be protected, the transfer payments for the TDR's
will be less. 154 All of these elements are necessary so that orderly development can proceed on sites that are economically
attractive to developers. It is only under such circumstances
that the system will be able to guarantee the marketability of
the transferred rights. This guarantee is necessary to avoid
some of the financial and constitutional objections that can be
raised.
One way of accomplishing guaranteed marketability is to
locate the transfer district in a proper transition area. Transition areas are those that are moving toward higher densities
as a result of market forces or local planning. As far as farmlands are concerned, we define transition areas as those farmlands that, because of criteria such as soil conditions, land
value, and regional development patterns, are less valuable as
farmland than for development purposes. If the demand exists for greater density and development than that which the
current zoning ordinance would permit, the area can be designated as a transfer area rather than rezoned, thus providing a
development supply for the excess demand. This system provides a guaranteed market that is ready, willing, and able to
purchase the development rights.
The fifth step involves calculating the receiving capacity
of the transfer zone. It is necessary to determine what uses
will be permitted in the transfer zone. Even though the rights
transferred from the preservation zone may have been based
on criteria such as the number of residential units that could
have been built there, there may be no reason why the rights,
once transferred, cannot or should not be used for commercial
or industrial purposes. The probability of conversion must be
taken into account. For this reason it might be simpler to
identify the rights in terms of economic value rather than
physical units. Nevertheless, it should be apparent that any
154.

Carried one step further, it is possible that a comprehensive land use con-

trol system which utilizes the best devices in the most compatible and most efficient
manner can create value. In effect the value of the area designated as a transfer area
may be enhanced. It follows then that a windfall recapture provision should be established to facilitate transfer payments. See WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 8, at
376-398.
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TDR scheme involves considerable planning and should be
considered a part of any comprehensive growth management
plan.
The final step involves establishing a procedure to
achieve a reasonable balance between the outstanding number
of development rights and the transfer zone's capacity to absorb those rights. This is potentially a problem because some
developers may not purchase development rights, choosing instead to build at a lower density. If this happens, there is an
immediate surplus of transfer zone capacity and the market
becomes unstable.
The procedure outlined above is essentially a private
TDR proposal; the government is not involved in the actual
purchase and sale of the TDR's. The marketplace absorbs
transaction costs in connection with the purchase and sale
while costs of identification, definition, and mapping are
borne by the government. The government also designates
areas as preservation districts or transfer areas, thus creating
the "property interest" known as the TDR.
TDR systems are amenable to varying degrees of government involvement. Note that one principle purpose behind
government involvement in TDR systems is the avoidance of
the marketability problem. One public TDR system, the
Puerto Rico plan, provides for the government purchase of all
the development rights; no private market for the purchase or
sale exists. 155 This plan operates through the Puerto Rico
Planning Board which is unusually comprehensive in its jurisdiction, having island-wide authority. Such regional jurisdiction allows the Planning Board to determine land use in other
areas as development proposals emerge. The Board is also
party to all transfer transactions and defines precisely the situations requiring compensation and the amount of compensation due.
Under the Chicago Plan, a hybrid public scheme, the government would establish a development rights bank. If the
owner of development rights is unable or unwilling to sell his
rights on the open market, he has the option of selling his
155. COSTONIS & DEVOY, THE PtmRTO Rico PLAN: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER (1975).
A government purchase system was used in Suffolk, New York. See Peterson &
McCarthy, Farmland Preservation by Purchase of Development Rights: The Long
Island Experiment, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 447 (1977).
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rights to the government owned bank, thus guaranteeing
saleability. Some TDR rights' advocates feel hopeful for this
sort of system, believing that it could eventually become
profit-making for the government.156 Others are doubtful as to
to survive
its feasibility and question the bank's ability
15 7
financially when construction activity slumps.

The New Jersey TDR program contains the least amount
of governmental involvement. In that state there is a five million dollar reserve fund. If a development rights owner can
prove to the TDR commission that he is unable to sell his
rights on the open market, the TDR commission will buy
those rights with monies from1"the fund and will reimburse the
fund upon sale of the rights.
Prior to implementation of a TDR program or passage of
any legislation, substantial thought needs to be given to its
potential impact, legality, marketability, urban design, statutory approval, and uniformity.
Guaranteed marketability of the development rights is
necessary to avoid the taking issue in a TDR scheme. Critics
of the program question the legality of some measures that
might be utilized to accomplish such a scheme. They argue
that the TDR's artificially depress the market value of the
property in the transfer area in order to make the TDR's valuable. Likewise, if the TDR's have nowhere to locate, their
value disappears.1 5
Some question whether zoning enacted merely to create a
ceiling and hence to guarantee marketability of TDR's is a
valid exercise of the police power. The answer is yes, but only
if the TDR's and zoning together operate to further goals set
by the comprehensive plan and the land value is not depressed below constitutional limits. Critics of TDR systems
argue that development rights that can drift across the city
and touch down anywhere within a transfer district must necessarily upset the zoning design. 1 60 This assumes that zoning
laws are in perfect balance and that zones are drawn to allow
156. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of
Urban Landmarks, 85 HAsv. L. REv. 574 (1972).
157.

B. Chavooshian, T. Norman & G. Nieswand, supra note 147, at 805.

156. NATIONAL CONFMMNCE, supra note 151, at 315.
159. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).

160. Berger, supra note 124, at 808.
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the maximum development potential of the land. Probably
neither assumption is entirely true. In any event a well
thought out TDR scheme can be coordinated with zoning to
carry out the comprehensive plan in a more effective manner."' With the intelligent planning needed to select transfer
districts, to place limits on the use of transfer rights, to establish procedures to monitor the plan's impact on both the preservation of land and development within transfer areas, this
will assure the critical input required to satisfy the comprehensive plan."6 '
Most communities lack enabling power to carry on preservation via the purchase and sale of development rights. Local governments must therefore be prepared to demonstrate
that state legislatures have authorized them to enact these
programs under the police power.
Uniformity simply requires that no owner within a district be subject to restrictions more burdensome than his
neighbors within that district. It does not bar one owner from
gaining a special benefit, so long as all other owners within the
district have the same opportunity. If TDR's are equally
available to all landowners within the transfer district, uniformity will not be a problem. PUD and cluster zoning should
serve as sufficient precedent to obtain judicial approval with
regard to any uniformity objection. 1e6
Owners of the resource selected for protection argue that,
as a result of the TDR system, their property rights are being
taken without due process of law. It is at this juncture that
the alternative compensation system would be utilized to
avoid this constitutional objection or to foster the new land
ethic described earlier. The constitutionality of a TDR system
from a compensation point of view is discussed by Chief
Justice Brietel in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of
New York.'"
161.

See generally Mandelker, The Role of the Local Comprehensive Plan in

Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. Rzv. 899 (1976).
162.

Berger, supra note 124, at 810.

163. Costonis, supra note 149, at 120.
164. 42 N.Y.2d 325, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (1977), a/I'd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The
United States Supreme Court held no taking had occurred. The Court, therefore,

found it unnecessary to decide whether the TDR's would have constituted adequate
or just compensation. This Court did not address the viability of a middle ground.
Some commentators believe the Court explicitly recognized the constitutionality of

TDR's. See, e.g., Marcus, Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York, 30
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The use of TDR's for the preservation of prime agricultural land is promising if used in the right geographical area,
and is an equitable solution to an increasingly serious problem. However the true test as to its workability depends on
empirical data regarding the actual areas involved, and the
economics affecting that land.
If a private system is used and the purchase and sale of
TDR's occurs in the market place, no alternative compensation system is needed. The system will simply funnel costs
back into the private system. If, however, the government
steps in to assure marketability, it seems appropriate to value
TDR's according to an alternative compensation system.
Otherwise the cost to the government of guaranteeing a market may be prohibitive.
B. Easements
Several states have adopted the use of conservation easethe problem of
ments as an alternative means of dealing with
1
preservation of prime agricultural land. " A conservation
easement exists when "the fee owner relinquishes all development rights [on his land] except those specifically reserved in
166
the easement grant instrument." The rights that the fee
owner reserves include "any regular use [of167the land] exerthat does not
cised prior to acquisition of the easement"
"materially impair" the preservation of the agricultural
land. 1 "8In return for its newly acquired interest in the land,
the government must compensate the fee owner in an amount
equal to the worth of the relinquished development rights.
This arrangement gives local government a tool almost as efLAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. No. 9, at 4 (1978).
165. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:1B-1 to 4:lB-15

(West Supp. 1979-1980) which
reestablishes a demonstration "development easement" program for New Jersey.
Farmers voluntarily sell their "development easements" to a state body which pays
"fair value of the development potential of such lands for non-agricultural purposes."
This discussion of easements applies to covenants as well with only technical
legal modifications. Essentially, the government bargains for a promise from the landowner not to develop his land rather than take a grant from the landowner. See also
CODE
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 51200-51295 (West 1966 & Supp. 1980); CAL. REv. & TAx.
1980).
Supp.
§§ 421-430.5 (West 1970 &
166. Comment, Easements to Preserve Open Space Land, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 728,
733 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Easements to Preserve Open Space].
167. Id.
168. Id. at 733; Note, Scenic Easements, 8 IDAHO L. REv. 131, 132 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Scenic Easements].
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fective as a fee purchase, but usually with lower costs. 169

The basic procedure for determining which lands are to
be preserved by means of conservation easements is a relatively simple three step process: First, it is necessary to define
precisely what constitutes prime agricultural land. Second, it
is necessary to determine which general areas are or will be in
danger of development within a set period of time. Third, it is
necessary to locate the specific parcels within those general
areas that meet the criteria of prime agricultural land.
Once the specific parcels to be preserved are located, it is
necessary to determine the development potential of those
parcels. If the land is already zoned, the development potential can be based on the highest and best use possible under
the zoning ordinance or alternatively, on the actual use value
70
as described earlier.'

A conservation easement may be acquired by a negotiated
transaction or by eminent domain. An easement that is acquired through the former means may either be purchased or
donated, with the seller receiving either payment or tax benefits as compensation.'7
The amount of compensation is generally measured by
"the difference between the value of the land given its highest
and best use before the imposition of restrictions . . . and the
value of the land given its highest and best use after the easement restrictions are in effect."' 1 7 As noted above, however,

this is not the only measure available-the alternative compensation is based on the actual use value at the time the
easement is purchased. Information such as "neighborhood
data regarding growth patterns, location, availability of utilities, topography, access, and real estate tax rates'

73

can all be

helpful in establishing this alternative figure.
Of course, it is financially more desirable for the government to persuade land owners to donate the easements. "The
169. Easements to Preserve Open Space, supra note 166, at 731. A distinction
must be made between acquiring an easement for the purpose of preserving land,
which we assert is valid if coupled with some form of compensation, and restricting
land to depress its value so that the government can acquire it later, which we assert
is invalid. See Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany 40
N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
170. Roe, supra note 152, at 434.
171. Id. at 430.
172. Easements to Preserve Open Space, supra note 166, at 742.
173. Id. at 731.
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donor of a conservation easement would be entitled to a charitable reduction on her income taxes 17 4 in an amount "equal
' ' 17
to the fair market value of the property right donated. 1 In

addition, and perhaps more importantly, the landowner would
in the property taxes levied
likely be entitled to a reduction
76
against the protected land.

Because some landowners might refuse to relinquish their
development rights voluntarily, it is necessary to provide for
the exercise of eminent domain power as an alternative means
of obtaining conservation easements. Often the threat of condemnation is an effective way to induce the few inevitable
177
hold-outs in the targeted preservation zone to negotiate.
Nevertheless, the landowner who relinquishes his development rights through eminent domain proceedings will theoretically receive the same compensation as the landowner who
voluntarily sells his rights. The government, however, will find
eminent domain proceedings more expensive as a result of
added administrative costs.
After determining how the easement will be acquired, it is
necessary to decide how long the easement will run. An easement may run in perpetuity or for a term of years. Easements
running in perpetuity, of course, are of greatest benefit to the
public. Not only does this form avoid the administrative expense of renewing an expiring easement, but also an easement
in perpetuity more effectively fulfills the public purpose of
preserving open space.1 7 A short term may serve
as only an incubatory term for the development potential
of the land, while a term of perpetuity will assure that the
easement will be abandoned only if a public space purpose no longer exists. Furthermore, given the increasing
development value of most land, renegotiation of an easement twenty years hence could well result in a higher
'17
price for the easement,

174.
175.
176.

Roe, supra note 152, at 430.
Easements to Preserve Open Space, supra note 166, at 736.
Roe, supra note 152, at 430. This is an example of combining the direct

177.

Comment, The Use of Easements to Preserve Oregon Open Space, 12

method of easement acquisition with the indirect method of tax relief. See also
Meyers, supra note 135, at 7-23.
WILLAMEgr L.J. 124, 129 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Use of Easements].
178. Id.
179.

Easements to Preserve Open Space, supra note 166, at 739.
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thereby creating an unbearable financial burden on local governments. On the other hand, landowners might feel more
comfortable about relinquishing their development rights for
a period of years, knowing that at some point they can put
their land to a different and perhaps more profitable use.180
The greatest benefit the government derives from the use
of easements is their economy. In addition, "all easements
leave the encumbered land on the local property tax rolls because the fee subject to the easement remains in the hands of
the original owners." 1 81 Furthermore, "the expense of maintaining the land remains with the fee owner.' 82
The benefit to the landowner in the easement scheme is
that he is allowed to remain on his land and continue to use it
in the manner delineated by the arrangement between fee
owner and easement purchaser. If the value of the land is depressed below the actual use value, then some compensation
for governmental intrusion will be made. In addition, if the
landowner grants a conservation easement on a portion of his
land, development values may increase on the remainder because of a guaranteed absence of creeping urbanization.
Local governments face a three-fold financial burden in
implementing the use of easements: lost tax revenues, administrative expenses, and procurement costs. In addition to the
reduction in present tax revenues, there is a potential revenue
loss by preventing the intensive land development that would
increase the future tax base of the community. Administrative
expenses include, but are not limited to, the costs of surveying, title examination, property valuation, negotiation, and litigation expenses.
"Ironically, society's need for open space is usually greatest in the urban fringe area where development pressure is
greatest and land values are highest."'' 8 When an easement is
purchased near the urban fringe where the development potential is great, the value of that easement "is measured in
large part by the benefit that the owner would have received
from development or from sale."'" This valuation may ap180.

See generally Conference on Scenic Easements in Action, Workshop

Manual, Univ. of Wis. (1966).
181.
182.
183.
184.

Easements to Preserve Open Space, supra note 166, at 735.
Id. at 735-36.
Id. at 741.
Scenic Easements, supra note 168, at 138.
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proach the cost of a fee, in which case an alternative means of
compensation must be sought together with a package of agricultural land preservation tools.
There is a need for legislation to cover land preservation
easements since courts are reluctant to impose new land use
restrictions.685 Statutory language could provide that all conservation easements will be construed to run with the land,
thereby avoiding common law questions of interpretation as
to whether an easement is appurtenant or in gross-an interpretation that will determine how long an easement is effective.1 86 One constitutional challenge to the conservation easement scheme might be that such a scheme does not serve a
valid public purpose. This challenge is also applicable to
TDR's used for the same purpose. The United States Supreme Court, however, indicated that the use of eminent domain to satisfy asthetic goals serves a valid public purpose.187
This policy should easily extend to compensable regulations,
particularly where the effect of the regulation is to preserve
food resources through conservation of agricultural land. The
outcome will probably depend on whether courts perceive the
loss of prime agricultural land as both an immediate and severe problem.
Statutory problems can be overcome with careful drafting
of the legislation. Some suggestions from Oregon include precisely defining preservation easements to maintain separation
from the scenic easement definition, allowing for the power of
eminent domain, providing for funding, establishing that all
such conservation easements run with the land, and providing
guidance for the state and local governments who will administer the programs. 88
In sum, using easements with a compensatory regulation
for the preservation of prime agricultural land is a relatively
simple concept. There are no major legal roadblocks, and operationally the system seems workable. The major difficulty
attending the use of conservation easement is funding. The
element that distinguishes easements from TDR's is transferability. With easements, the government is the purchaser and
the development rights attendant to the easement do not go
185. Id.
186. Id. at 142.
187. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
188.

The Use of Easements, supra note 177, at 126.
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anywhere. With TDR's, on the other hand, transfer of development rights is the essence. If the areas that are most in
need of preservation also happen to be the areas that are most
expensive due to development potential, the easement program might be economically unfeasible. The decision of
whether to use TDR's or easements to preserve land depends,
therefore, on how much money the state has available for use
in such projects and on what geographical areas are in need of
preservation.
C. Institutional Alternatives: The Florida Property Rights
Law
Thus far, our discussion has centered on TDR's and easements, all property interests. Should a government feel that
such devices are too cumbersome or too costly, then institutional changes in courts or administrative agencies can and
should be made to create a legal cause of action in the property owner to redress perceived losses caused by governmental
regulation. The Florida Property Rights law' s is a good example. This law creates a cause of action and the trial court provides a forum for the disposition of taking claims that arise
because of a denial of certain enumerated permits.1 90
The Florida law enables any person who feels substantially affected by certain enumerated agencies' regulations to
initiate a court suit requesting monetary damages or other relief. For our purposes, a similar law might specify that farmers
aggrieved by actions of the identified state agencies may challenge the actions of those bodies. What the act does is grant
to the landowner a cause of action for monetary damages in
addition to allowing the landowner to seek a judicial declaration of invalidity of the complained of regulation. It is the
statutory equivalent of the inverse condemnation suit.' 91 In
Florida, court review is confined solely "to determining
whether final agency action is an unreasonable exercise of the
state's police power constituting a taking without compensa189. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.212, 253.763, 373.617, 380.085, 403.90 (West Supp.
1980). See also Comment, Oregon's Senate Bill 827 and the Problem of Just Compensation for Down Zoning, 59 OR. L. REv. 124 (1980).
190. Rhodes, The FloridaPropertyRights Law, 31 LAND UsE L. & ZONING Di.
No. 1, at 5 (1979).
191. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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Once that determination is made, the matter is re-

manded to the agency which shall either grant relief from the
regulation or pay monetary damages.""3 If the agency fails to
submit a proposed order within a reasonable time not to exceed ninety days, the court may order relief or damages together with attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party.1 9The Florida plan was designed to allow inverse condem195
nation suits which the Florida courts would not entertain.
The purpose was to make available to landowners an alternative remedy necessitated by the advent of "second generation land use restrictions" such as resource protection
regulations. 96
The chief weakness in the statute is that it sets out no
criteria for either the court or the agency by which they can
make a determination as to what constitutes a compensable
event. According to the legislative history of the act there has
been a taking without compensation when a private property
owner suffers a greater burden than other real property owners as a result of land use restrictions for the benefit of the
public or a sector of the public. 17 The courts are authorized
to grant relief upon finding that the individual property owner
is "carrying more than his fair share as the price for public
benefit."198
Since the test does not clarify at what point a property
owner becomes unduly burdened by a regulation, the result is
that the unduly burdened individual's property has been
taken in the traditional sense. For this he is entitled to receive
highest and best use compensation according to article V, section 2 of the Florida Constitution.
The second weakness in the statute is its silence as to the
amount of compensation. If the agency or the court is required to authorize the payment of compensation according to
the highest and best use standard, the purposes of alternative
compensation systems are destined to fail. Under the Florida
192. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.085(3) (West Supp. 1980).
193. Id. See also MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, supra note 20, at 9-112(3).
194. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.085(4)-(5) (West Supp. 1980).
195. See Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Rhodes, supra note 190, at 6.
196. Rhodes, supra note 190, at 5.
197. FLORIDA SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LAND ACQUISITION, FINAL REPORT 6 (1976).
198. Id. at 4.
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law the same anomalies inherent in the traditional takings law
means that the regulation is invalidated, and hence the purpose of the legislation is frustrated, or the government is
forced to pay the maximum for its regulation. 199
In contrast, the primary goals of the TDR or easement
schemes are lacking in the Florida plan. First, TDR's and
easements both attempt to decrease the cost to the government in acquiring developmental rights. They do so by allowing the property owner to continue his present use of the
land while paying him only the value of that which is taken as
a result of the regulation. Conversely, the Florida plan appears to be an all-or-nothing proposition. Either the regulation stands as valid or full compensation is paid. In the alternative, a variance is granted or the regulation is altered on its
face to come within the ambit of a valid police power regulation. In any event, either the government or the individual
property owner is the sole victor. There is no middle ground
or compromise under the Florida plan.
Second, through the use of easements or TDR's there is
an attempt to remedy the potential inequities of the regulation prior to or concurrently with its implementation. The
government accepts the burden of determining who the affected property owners will be and thereby compensates them
for their loss. Conversely, under the Florida scheme, the property owner cannot seek a remedy until after implementation
of the regulation and he is forced to incur the expense of litigation with no guarantee of relief.
In conclusion, the Florida plan does no more than specifically authorize remedial relief for overly burdensome regulations, but does so on an ad hoc basis that seems destined to
frustrate any comprehensive or regional planning objectives.
The procedure is expensive in terms of the compensation required as well as the court costs incurred. This device, as
drafted, simply implies that the regulation will stand when
coupled with compensation. In traditional legal terms, the
governmental regulation will result in a forced condemnation
or judicial invalidation.
199.

Rhodes,

supra note 190, at 5.
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CONCLUSION

The fundamental premise of this article has been that the
various levels of government have no comprehensive land
preservation policy. Indeed, the need for government control
at this or any other time is debatable. Nevertheless, there exist certain social, political, economic, and legal perceptions
that favor a serious consideration of the question of government control to preserve this resource.
There are fundamental political and legal reasons for the
lack of a comprehensive preservation policy. Politically, there
is a lack of coordination between the levels of government,
with a lopsided balance of power in the land-use field in favor
of local government autonomy. This results in a parochial application of land .se laws that undercuts effective coordinated
and complimentary land uses. Hence, before a truly workable
and comprehensive land preservation policy can be developed,
certain basic allocations of authority must be made.
A second area in which coordination would be beneficial
is in the implementation of particular land use controls. The
primary focus of this article has been what we have termed
"alternative compensations systems." They can, if properly
designed, strike a balance between the traditional compensation/no compensation classifications. Even so, these are only
tools that must be properly mixed with foresight and intelligent general planning, employing a broad range of other available controls (e.g., zoning,200 land banking, 20 1 taxation, °2 and
200. An alternative to the use of compensatory regulations for preservation of
farmland is the implementation of zoning ordinances. Zoning is at the regulation end

of the police power-eminent domain continuum and requires no compensation. In its
simplest form, zoning is the restriction of a particular area of land for particular uses.

A similar device is the "agricultural district" which offers farmers a package of benefits such as favorable valuation, restriction on taxation of utilities, limitations on the

power of eminent domain, less regulation of normal farming practices and a policy
encouraging state agencies to promote the preservation and development of farmlands. See Assessment to Preserve Agricultural Land, supra note 136, at 643-45;
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 27 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); VA. CODE §§ 15.1-1506
to -1513 (Supp. 1979). Zoning for agricultural purposes is a valid technique under
appropriate circumstances.
Keeping a basic constitutional framework in mind, it is possible to explore zoning
and its particular applicability to the preservation of farm land. In the past, two

types of zoning ordinances have been used to preserve agricultural land. One involves
zoning through large minimum lot size requirements, which has the effect of making
farming the only economically feasible use of the land. Note, FarmlandPreservation
Techniques; Some Food for Thought, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 258, 260-61 (1979). The
other involves zoning strictly for agricultural use. See Gisler v. County of Madera, 38
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eminent domain). Even if economic efficiency is the state's
long range goal, the question that now must be asked is which
mixture of devices in what geographical areas can be used to
achieve that end?
This article has discussed the role of TDR's and conservation easements as tools for land preservation. Because of
this restriction tax relief may be necessary, but also, depending on what the government hopes to achieve, a tax policy
may be designed with appropriate incentives or disincentives
for the accumulation of large holdings or for sale for development. Roll back provisions, for example, may be effectively
used to discourage sales for non-agricultural purposes. It is
Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974).
The second type of zoning ordinance may be implemented strictly for the preservation of prime agricultural land. Preservation of prime agricultural land is gaining
increased acceptance as a legitimate public purpose. Joyce v. City of Portland, 24 Or.
App. 689, 546 P.2d. 1100 (1976).
Some states have implemented agricultural zoning by statute. The statutes are
all similar in that they set aside areas which are to be used for agriculture and other
uses which do not conflict with farming. See HAWAII RED. STAT. § 205-5 (Supp. 1979);
Oa. REV. STAT. §§ 215.203-215.263 (1979); Wis. STAT. §§ 91.71-91.179 (West Supp.
1979-1980).
201. Land banking is a mechanism by which the government acquires privately
held land through purchase, gift or condemnation pursuant to a general state plan.
This device is at the opposite end of the continuum in relation to zoning, which
means that the government must pay dearly to acquire land through this technique.
The government then manages the land, leases it or sells it to farmers subject to
appropriate development right retention or restrictive covenants. "The central legal
issue confronting [a land banking scheme to preserve agricultural land] is whether
the power of eminent domain used for acquiring land for unspecified uses at some
unprescribed future date" serves a valid public interest. Keene, A Review of Governmental Policies and Techniques for Keeping Farmers Farming, 19 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 119, 142 (1979). See also Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Russo, 95 P.R.R. 488
(1967); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Land banking is presently being used by authority of statute in several states.
The statutes are all similar in that they provide for condemnation of privately held
land for future agricultural use. See HAWAiI REv. STAT. §§ 155-1, 171-20, 171-33-17137, 171-65-171-68, 171-111-171-117 (Supp. 1979); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 61, § 14
(West Supp. 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 5001-5013 (Purdon Supp. 1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 11-1716 (Supp. 1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 84.34.200-84.34.240 (West
Supp. 1980).
Land banking appears to be a viable alternate mechanism to preservation of agricultural land. Recently, the American Law Institute adopted a comprehensive land
banking provision. MODEL LAND DEVLOPmENT CODE, supra note 20, art. 6. Land
banking is defined as a "system in which a governmental entity acquires a substantial
fraction of the land in a region that is available for future growth of the region." Id.
at 221.
202. See Dunford, A Survey of Property Tax Relief for the Retention of Agricultural and Open Space Lands, 15 GONZAGA L. REv. 675 (1980).
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necessary to recognize that these devices generally cannot be
used in isolation. At the extremes, zoning and land banking
have their place as well. Zoning, in areas unthreatened by development, may be the only direct device needed. Land banking may be used in more rapidly developing areas where the
government wants to insure protection of farmlands and other
open space. And of course, application or elimination of the
highest and best use principle of compensation permeates decisions surrounding each of the devices discussed above.
These alternative and traditional devices can be applied
in a pattern of concentric circles: land banking in the heart of
a developed area, then TDR's, easements, and zoning as we
move outward. Concommitently, these devices must be coupled with a compensation system that is compatible with the
objectives of each. These objectives are not served by a
scheme utilizing the highest and best use principle, rather by
an alternative compensation system that can and will work.
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